



# 115 North Duke Street

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Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574  
April 10, 2019

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Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2, 2019

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115 North Duke Street

## **ABSTRACT**

On April 10, 2019, a natural gas explosion occurred at the coffee shop Kaffeinate located at 115 North Duke Street, Durham, NC. An explosive atmosphere was created when a gas service line was struck during a horizontal boring operation. This breach allowed fugitive gas to flow until reaching an ignition source, at which time an explosion occurred resulting in severely damaged and destroyed buildings. As a result of the explosion, several persons, including firefighters, were injured and two fatalities occurred. This investigation will discover critical timelines and actions resulting in this natural gas explosion. This investigation will be conducted under the standards and guidance of “NFPA 921 (The Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations).”

Note: This report will reference actions of fire department operations and Optic Cable Technology LLC; *however*, this is not an after-action review of tactics or decisions made by referenced members. It is the obligation of the investigator to investigate and document origin, cause and circumstances of the event. The sole purpose of any referenced action is to fulfill the obligations of NFPA 921 and any other use of this information is not the intent of the investigator.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At approximately 1006 hours on Wednesday April 10, 2019, a natural gas explosion and subsequent collapse followed by a fire, destroyed a building located at 115 North Duke Street. The building was occupied by business entities Kaffeinate and Prescient. The explosion caused a range of injuries to an estimated 25 victims, including two fatalities. A number of adjacent properties in the area were also significantly damaged.

The natural gas release was caused by a horizontal drill operated by Optic Cable Technology LLC. The three-person crew which included an operator, a locator and a helper, breached a  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch service line providing gas service to 115 North Duke Street at approximately 0906 hours. The breach was subterranean, approximately five feet from the exterior of Kaffeinate. Approximately 46,000 cubic feet of natural gas flowed from this gas line. (Appendix 1, PHMSA Report). No one from Optic Cable Technology LLC drilling crew called 911 to report the leak.

The first 911 call occurred at approximately 0911 hours in the vicinity of 401 North Duke Street. This call was made by Yolanda Watson to the Durham 911 center from her cell phone as she drove north on North Duke Street. Ms. Watson stated that while she sat in traffic between Main and Morgan Street waiting for the light to change, the smell of gas “engulfed” her car with all the windows up. Ms. Watson further explained that as she began to drive towards Morgan Street the smell continued to be prevalent. She did not know the source of the smell.


Based on Ms. Watson’s 911 call, Durham Fire Department (DFD) Engine 1 (E1) was dispatched to 401 North Duke Street for a Gas Leak/Odor call. (Appendix 2 - Report # 19-09571 Fire and EMS Event Report). E1 arrived in the area of 401 North Duke Street and investigated the smell of gas around the entire block where Durham School of the Arts is located. E1 did not detect any gas at any time during their lap of the area and they returned to service. The engine crew attributed the call to a gas pressure relief valve located at the southeast corner of the intersection of Duke and Morgan Street on the rear of the Duke Research Laboratory (rear of 701 Main Street).

Don Smith, owner of PS Splicing, LLC, was recorded making a 911 call shortly after his arrival at the scene at 0937 hours. In response, at approximately 0940 hours, E1 responded to the reported gas leak in the area of 115 North Duke Street. (Appendix 3 - Report # 19-09574 Fire and EMS Event Report). E1’s crew encountered Mr. Smith at the intersection of North Duke and Main Street. Mr. Smith directed the crew to the location of the gas leak. E1 positioned on North Duke Street and began to assess the scene and monitor the atmosphere for gas. Firefighters entered Kaffeinate shortly after arriving on scene. After using a gas meter and recognizing an immediate hazard, E1 began evacuating the business. Crew members faced resistance from Mr. Kong Lee, owner of Kaffeinate, to evacuate. The crew had no complications evacuating Kaffeinate’s other staff and customers. Crew members from E1 radioed this information to their Captain and proceeded to the next occupancy.

At approximately 1006 hours, a large explosion with a total building collapse and fire occurred at 115 North Duke Street. The blast wave from this incident caused varied amounts of damage to numerous buildings and vehicles. Ninety-one Durham Firefighters along with Durham County

EMS, Durham Police Department, Durham County Emergency Management, and Mutual-Aid Fire companies responded to this incident.

**Figure 1 depicts 115 North Duke Street before and after the explosion.**



## KEY INVESTIGATION FINDINGS

The Durham Fire Department investigation revealed:

- Optic Cable Technology LLC workers breached a gas line during a horizontal drilling operation at approximately 0906 hours.
- There was no evidence to indicate that any person had acted intentionally to create a fire or explosion at 115 North Duke Street.
- There was a  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch 60 psig gas line located in front of the structure (operating at 58 psig), which was breached sub-terrain.
- The breached gas line that was fractured was 20 inches below the surface and approximately five feet from Kaffeinate's entrance.
- The owner of Kaffeinate, Mr. Lee (Fatality 1), appeared to have knowledge of the gas leak moments after the breach and spoke to members of Optic Cable Technology LLC.
- Ms. Watson called 911 reporting a gas leak at 0911 hours in the vicinity of 401 North Duke Street.

- Mr. Smith, of PS Splicing LLC, called 911 at 0937 hours to report the gas leak.
- Based on video surveillance, Mr. Lee appeared to exit his business four times prior to the fire/explosion.
- Gas readings in Kaffeinate reached 100% of LEL on the Altair gas meter.
- Based upon debris analysis, the building damage was consistent with a natural gas explosion.
- Optic Cabling Technology LLC was operating under Permit Number 18-2826 that was originally issued on 06/27/2018 to Fiber Technologies Networks, LLC and was valid through 06/25/2019. (Appendix 4)

## KEY INVESTIGATION CONCLUSIONS

- Natural gas leaked from a fractured 3/4 inch service line located in the sidewalk footway in front of 115 North Duke Street.
- It is estimated that the natural gas flowed for one hour prior to the explosion.
- Based on the estimated one-hour flow time,  $\geq 46,000$  cubic feet of gas flowed from the breached line.
- No report of the smell of gas was made to 911 by any occupant of 115 North Duke Street (Kaffeinate).
- Mr. Lee (Fatality 1) and the crew of Optic Cable Technology LLC were aware of the gas leak moments after the breach and prior to Ms. Watson's 911 call at 0911 hours.
- Mr. Lee (Fatality 1), Mr. Smith, and the crew of Optic Cable Technology LLC were aware of the gas leak prior to E1's arrival at 115 North Duke Street.
- The gas accumulated within 115 North Duke Street reaching 100% of Lower Explosive Limits (LEL).
- The gas was ignited by an undetermined source within 115 North Duke Street leading to the explosion.
- There is no evidence of criminal intent by any company or individual to warrant criminal prosecution.

## PARTICIPATING FIRE INVESTIGATORS:

Brian Graves	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Brandon Link	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Chris Wilcox	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
David Merritt	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Michael Kromer	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Ashley Fletcher	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Joel Gullie	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Julius Richmond	Durham Fire Department (DFD)
Brian Massengill	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Daniel Strandh	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Gabriel Munter	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Kristen Kozar	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Johnathan Bell	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Larry Cox	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Howard Henry	Durham Police Department (DPD)
Tyler Fitts	Durham County Fire Marshals' Office (DCFMO)

Brian Lane	Durham County Fire Marshals' Office (DCFMO)
Mark Schell	Durham County Fire Marshals' Office (DCFMO)
William Marshal	North Carolina Office of State Marshal (OSFM)
Chad Edmonds	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
David Schable	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
Jeremy T. Crowder	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
A.B. Warren	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
C.N. Pegram	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
K.F. Cummings	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
M.T. Sheron	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
J.A. Bode	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
K.M. Bivins	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
HRD K9 Roxy	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI K9)
Patrick Nee	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI K9 handler)
HRD K9 Bart	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI K9)
K. A. Mathias	NC State Bureau of Investigation (SBI K9 Handler)
Chris Kearns	Town of Chapel Hill Fire Department
Chris Wells	Town of Chapel Hill Fire Department
Tommy Gregory	Town of Chapel Hill Fire Department

## **WEATHER CONDITIONS:**

www.wunderground.com reported the following weather conditions in Durham, North Carolina on April 10, 2019, at approximately 1006 hours: the temperature was 71 degrees Fahrenheit, the dew point was 35 degrees Fahrenheit, and humidity was 27%. Visibility was 5 miles and the winds were calm at 0 miles per hour.

## **PROPERTY OWNERS:**

[This information is based on Durham County tax records]

115 A/B North Duke Street  
2050 Bentley LLC  
71001 Wilkinson  
Chapel Hill, NC 27517

806 W Main, 111 North Duke Street  
Sehed Investment Group  
2020 West Main Street, Suite 300  
Durham, NC 27705

Sehed Investment Group  
2020 West Main Street, Suite 300  
Durham, NC 27705

800 / 802 West Main Street  
Matthews, David R TRS, Bachner, Mary Michele TRS  
C/O Suntrust Bank-PHI Department

150 West Main Street, 14<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Norfolk, VA 23510

## **SCENE SECURITY:**

The integrity of the scene was maintained by the Durham Fire Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Durham Police Department and the State Bureau of Investigation.

## **LEGAL PRESENCE:**

The fire/explosion scene investigation was conducted under the authority granted to Durham Fire Department through North Carolina State Statutes and the North Carolina State Building Code Fire Prevention Code. The relevant authorities are shown below:

### **N.C.G.S. § 58-79-1. Fires investigated; reports; records.**

The Director of the State Bureau of Investigation, through the State Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the State Fire Marshal, and the chief of the fire department, or chief of police where there is no chief of the fire department, in municipalities and towns, and the county fire marshal and the sheriff of the county and the chief of the rural fire department where such fire occurs outside of a municipality, are hereby authorized to investigate the cause, origin, and circumstances of every fire occurring in such municipalities or counties in which property has been destroyed or damaged, and shall specially make investigation whether the fire was the result of carelessness or design. A preliminary investigation shall be made by the chief of fire department or chief of police, where there is no chief of fire department in municipalities, and by the county fire marshal and the sheriff of the county or the chief of the rural fire department where such fire occurs outside of a municipality, and must be begun within three days, exclusive of Sunday, of the occurrence of the fire, and the Director of the State Bureau of Investigation, through the State Bureau of Investigation, shall have the right to supervise and direct the investigation when he deems it expedient or necessary.

### **N.C. State Building Code: Fire Prevention Code**

#### **104.11 Authority at fires and other emergencies.**

The fire chief or officer of the fire department in charge at the scene of a fire or other emergency involving the protection of life or property or any part thereof, shall have the authority to direct such operation as necessary to extinguish or control any fire, perform any rescue operation, investigate the existence of suspected or reported fires, gas leaks or other hazardous conditions or situations, or take any other action necessary in the reasonable performance of duty. In the exercise of such power, the fire chief is authorized to prohibit any person, vehicle vessel or thing from approaching the scene and is authorized to remove, or cause to be removed or kept away from the scene, any vehicle, vessel or thing which could impede or interfere with the operations of the fire department and, in the

judgment of the fire chief, any person not actually and usefully employed in the extinguishing of such fire or in the preservation of property in the vicinity thereof.

### **FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS:**

The building located at 115 North Duke Street was equipped with an automatic sprinkler system and an automatic fire alarm system. The sprinkler and fire alarm systems were located in the building occupied by Kaffeinate and Prescient. The sprinkler system was rendered inoperable by the effects of the explosion and therefore, there will be no further observations of the sprinkler system in this report.

### **INITIAL GAS DISCOVERY:**

On April 10, 2019, at approximately 0906 hours (per video documentation), a  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch gas line appears to be unintentionally breached which subsequently allowed fugitive gas to be released underground. This leak was discovered first by three employees of Optic Cable Technology LLC who were operating the equipment that struck the line. There is no evidence that any member of the Optic Cable Technology LLC crew called 911 reporting the breach.

Moments after the gas leak and according to video footage, Mr. Lee of Kaffeinate appeared to be in discussion with employees of Optic Cable Technology LLC. Mr. Lee was observed fanning his hands by his nose to suggest the presence of an offensive or foul smell (Investigator's Note: The smell was likely the odorant mercaptan, having a rotting cabbage-like smell). After this brief exchange, Mr. Lee returned to his business.

**Figure 2 depicts Mr. Lee approaching the Optic Cable workers about a foul smell at 09:07:25**



**(All displayed times have a correction factor of -1h: 6mins)**

The first 911 call reporting a smell of gas occurred at approximately 0911 hours in the vicinity of 401 North Duke Street. This call was made by Ms. Watson to the Durham 911 Center from her cell phone as she drove north on North Duke Street. Ms. Watson stated that while sitting in traffic between Main and Morgan Street waiting for the light to change, the smell of gas “engulfed” her car with all the windows up. Ms. Watson further explained that as she began to drive towards Morgan Street, the smell continued to be prevalent. She did not know the source of the smell. Based on this 911 Call, DFD E1 was dispatched to 401 North Duke Street for a Gas Leak/Odor call, Report 19-09571 (Appendix 2).

**Figure 3 depicts worker returning to drilling rig after gas line is struck. (0906 hours)**



**Gas Line Has Been Struck at 09:06:10 (all displayed times have a correction factor of -1h: 6mins)**

Ms. Watson encountered a significant amount of released gas that entered her vehicle. It is the opinion of this investigator that this gas entered her vehicle by the vehicle’s climate control system. This would explain the description of her vehicle being “engulfed” by the smell of gas. Ms. Watson did not know the origin of this gas and felt compelled to notify 911 to have someone verify the odor. The science of human reaction time to sight, sound, touch, smell and taste stimulus has significant variances. In this situation, Ms. Watson’s reaction time to the smell of gas engulfing her car, processing the smell, calling 911, and visual recognition of an address, likely accounts for her traveling to the next block, away from the leak, before fully detecting the smell. 911 Operator O’Sullivan recorded the following dispatch notes: “[EFD] Caller Statement: odor of gas „, near the beginning of the school outside area.. female passed it and smelled Chief Complaint: Gas Leak/Odor outside [04/10/19 09:13:02 OSULLIVAN]” “PER CALLER THE ODOR WAS AT THE INTERSECTION OF DUKE ST AND ONE BLOCK FROM MAIN ST. AT THE START OF THE SCHOOL [04/10/19 09:16:42OSULLIVAN]” (Appendix 2.)

**Figure 4 depicts Ms. Watson's direction of travel.**

E1 arrived on scene at 0917 hours (response time of three minutes and 56 seconds) after dispatch to the area of 401 North Duke Street. The dispatch address and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) notes directed E1 to go a block north from the actual gas leak site.

It can only be speculated why no additional calls to 911 were made for such a significant leak. Prior to the explosion, Ms. Watson called at approximately 0911 hours and Mr. Don Smith, owner of PS Splicing LLC called at approximately 0937 hours. This portion of North Duke Street is heavily traveled by both vehicle and pedestrian traffic. It is my estimate that more than one hundred people encountered this leak. Numerous people walked directly over the sidewalk where the leak originated.

[EFD] Caller Statement: hit gas line Chief Complaint: Gas leak/odor outside [04/10/19 09:38:26 MITCHELLM]-(Appendix 3)

## FIREFIGHTER OBSERVATIONS:

Engine 1's Acting Captain Phillip Faucette's narrative for 401 North Duke Street as documented in FIREHOUSE reads as follows:

E-1 was dispatched and responded to 401 N Duke St reference a reported odor of gas. UOA at the dispatch address E-1 A exited the apparatus and could not detect the odor of gas. Due to the fact that this address is a large area campus E-1 requested that communications have whomever called or someone with knowledge of the location meet E-1 and escort E-1 to where the smell was detected. Communications advised E-1 that the caller was a passerby and that they had no further information. E-1 got back on the

apparatus and pulled from the parking area back onto N Duke St and made our way north. At some point communications either verbalized our E-1 seen in the dispatch notes on the MCT that the caller had advised that the odor was detected at the intersection of N Duke and Morgan St. E-1 continued down N Duke St then turned left onto Trinity Ave. E-1 traveled on Trinity Ave towards Gregson St then turned left again onto Gregson St. E-1 traveled south on Gregson St to the intersection of Gregson and Morgan St where we again turned left onto Morgan St. E-1 went east on Morgan St to the Morgan St and N Duke St intersection. E-1 stopped at the intersection of N Duke and Morgan St and at no time during the entire duration of our response did anyone on the apparatus detect any odor of gas. While stopped at the intersection of Morgan St and N Duke St E-1 A advised the rest of the crew of a gas service on the north west corner of the building located on the south east corner of the intersection. This was a large service feeding the building and it was assumed that a pressure spike had most likely vented and was responsible for the smell that the passerby had detected. This was assumed because E-1 has responded to numerous calls of the same nature that could only be attributed to a venting situation.

Engine 1's Acting Captain Phillip Faucette's narrative for 115 North Duke Street as documented in FIREHOUSE reads as follows:

E-1 was dispatched and responded to 115 Duke St reference a reported gas leak. UOA E-1 was met by personnel from a horizontal boring company who advised that they had struck a gas line that was believed to be supplying 115A Duke St. E-1 advised communications to have PSNC respond to the address to repair the gas leak. E-1 tasked E-1 D with stretching our jump line and standing in proper PPE at the ready. E-1 B charged the hoseline then assisted E-1 A and E-1 C. E-1 C exited the apparatus with our Altair meter which had been turned on inside the truck in clean air while en route to the scene. The initial readings outside the structure were 10% LEL. E-1 cleared L-3 because my initial assessment was that E-1 personnel and equipment were sufficient to mitigate an incident with those specific readings. E-1 personnel entered 115A and the meter readings went up significantly. E-1 personnel advised all persons inside the address to evacuate immediately and everyone with the exception of the person who was believed to be the shop owner did so. E-1 A had already left the address and did not know that the shop owner had refused to leave until later in the incident. To the best of my recollection it was around this time that I requested communications to re dispatch L-3. E-1 spoke with L-3 and advised that the incident was very serious. E-1 B and E-1 C exited 115A and began metering the addresses to the right of 115A towards Morgan St and evacuating building occupants as necessary based off meter reading's as they went in a counterclockwise direction around the buildings adjacent to 115A. E-1 A had already exited 115A and went to the left of the address towards Main St and went inside

Torreros restaurant where he found only a slight odor of gas. E-1 A advised the employees of Torreros that he would advise as to whether they should close the business shortly. While returning to 115A E-1 A saw a male subject standing in front of the address and immediately advised the subject that he should not be in that area. The subject seemed agitated and told E-1 A "this is my shop; you can't make me leave". To the best of my recollection this exchange occurred multiple times. After it was clear that the subject was not going to evacuate E-1 A advised communications to attempt to contact B-1. Communications advised that they could not access FTAC 1 in order to contact B-1. E-1 A switched over to FTAC 1 and advised B-1 of the situation at hand and also requested that B-1 respond to the scene. B-1 advised E-1 that having DPD respond would be an appropriate action and that B-1 would be en route to the scene. E-1 switched back to our OPS channel and advised communications to have DPD respond. I E-1 A believe that it was at about this point in time that I requested that E-1 B and E-1 C go to Torreros and meter the interior of the restaurant. The employee from PSNC arrived at about this time also and E-1 A spoke to him and advised that the leak appeared to be under the sidewalk just in front of 115A and that there appeared to be a cutoff near the leak. The PSNC employee advised that he was going to go check to see. E-1 A turned towards Main St and began walking in that direction because I had heard and seen a DPD unit responding towards the scene on Duke St code 3. As E-1 A was walking towards Main St I believe that I was just past our apparatus location when the explosion occurred. I immediately assessed the situation to the best of my ability and advised communications of what had occurred and that we would need at least 2 alarms and that we had multiple persons injured. E-1 A met E-1 D who was running towards Main St. To the best of my recollection he advised that he was ok but thought he was bleeding. A lot of what occurred just after the explosion is not completely clear to me. I remember that I could see that there was only a small amount of fire initially but that it was in close proximity to where there was a person trapped in the rubble. Because of my request for E-1 B to back up the E-1 apparatus, the jump line was shut down and disconnected for a short time. However, due to urgency, the apparatus was not moved so that the jump line could be reconnected and used to provide protection for DFD personnel working to attempt to remove the person trapped by rubble. I also took the water can and CO2 extinguisher to the trapped persons location as added protection. E-1 B was the pump operator from the start of protection and suppression efforts until our crew left the scene to visit E-1 D in the ER. E-1 B and E-1 C assisted with getting injured persons to safe locations. E-1 C also worked to assist with removing the person trapped. E-1 A worked establishing an initial water source for E-1 and also hooking E-1 up to L-3 to relay pump for ladder pipe operations. E-1 A also worked to establish a second water source for E-1 after stretching a 2 1/2" handline and learning

that the truck did not have enough incoming water to support operation of this line.

All times associated with this report will be amended. Times listed are incorrect due to dispatch errors.

**Additional firefighter observations:**

Engine 1's Acting Driver Skyler McEvoy's written statement for 115 North Duke Street reads as follows:

E1 was dispatched to 115 N Duke for a gas leak call. E1 responded to location. On arrival I stopped short and uphill of the address to coincide with field operating guide for natural gas that can be found on CODI. I then placed the truck in pump gear, put on my helmet, got out of the truck, put out my chock and went through the process of getting the truck ready to pump. I then pulled the jump line with assistance from E1D and placed it in line with the truck with the nozzle at the nose of the truck. I then charged the line and set my relief valve. I then partnered up with E1C to begin metering and evacuating buildings as needed. We started in Kaffeinate (115 A N Duke St.) because we believed it would be the business in the most risk due to location of the leak. I walked in with E1C, who had the meter, and stated that there was a gas leak and that we needed everyone to exit the structure. At this time the patrons started packing their stuff and preparing to leave. I then asked the owner and the barista if there was anything with an open flame or that was electric that could act as an ignition source. They said that there was only the waffle maker. I asked them to turn it off and to exit the structure. The barista then closed the register and grabbed her tips from the jar. The owner then questioned the barista: "You are going to leave?" who responded "Yes I get off at 10:30 anyways so I might as well go now." I then repeated the need for everyone to exit the structure. The patrons and barista exited the structure, knowing that I could not forcefully remove the owner I exited the structure with E1C and informed my Captain that the owner did not want to leave and then moved to the next business to continue metering and evacuating as needed. The next building we checked was 115 B. Upon entering the building we informed the inhabitants that there was a gas leak and that we needed to meter the structure. The meter was still alarming from Kaffeinate and so I instructed E1C to reset the meter so we could get a reading of this business. After resetting the meter E1C went to the rooms that were closest to Kaffeinate to see if we could detect anything. The meter did not detect anything in those areas or anywhere else as we exited the structure. We exited out of the structure on the Gregson St side of the building into the courtyard. We then made contact with the employees at Prescient who were outside in the parking lot because they had smelled gas in the building. We got one of them to let E1C and I into the structure using their fob so we could meter the structure. They then stated everyone was out of the structure. We metered at the back bathrooms of the

structure that were closest to Kaffeinate and got a reading on the meter but I was not informed of the exact reading. Because everyone was out of the structure we moved to the next business which was 111 N Duke. The inhabitants of this address were already in the parking lot. We informed them there was a gas leak and that we needed to meter the structure. I then had the curator of the collection let us in the business and then she returned to the parking lot. We then metered the structure and got a reading of 7% LEL in the corner by Kaffeinate. We were impressed by the collection of cars in there and then exited and told the inhabitants that we had detected gas and to stay out of the structure. Next we went to St. James and informed them that there was a gas leak and stated that we needed to meter. We metered the business at the points closest to the source and did not get a reading. We exited the business and then over the radio E1A instructed E1C and I to meter Torero's at the other corner of the block. We walked into the business and informed them there was a gas leak and that we needed to meter the structure. We were walking back to the kitchen, which was closest to the source of the gas leak to meter, and then the explosion occurred. We then directed the inhabitants of Torero's down Main St towards Gregson away from the explosion. I then ran toward the engine and the explosion knowing that the rest of my crew was probably injured. I met E1D in the dust cloud caused by the explosion. He had cuts all over his face and looked dazed; I asked him if he was okay and he responded he was okay. I walked him to the corner of Main and N Duke by where L3 was parked. I sat him down and again asked if he was okay and he said he was. An off-duty firefighter then began assisting E1D. Another person then walked out of the dust cloud and sat down beside E1D. This PT was bleeding from superficial cuts to his face. I asked him if he was okay he said he was fine and was deemed a green tag and there were other units there so I ran back into the cloud to see if there was anyone else hurt. I grabbed the rest of my turnout gear and SCBA from the engine driver side mid-compartment and ran it to the other side of the truck because there was active fire and the stability of the wall closest to the E1 driver side did not seem sound. I donned my PPE and then ran to the pile of debris where one of the severely injured victims was. I grabbed a large section of metal that had been blown off the structure and improvised a backboard to drag the patient out. E2C and a Durham PD officer then helped me place the PT on the "backboard" and drag him to an ambulance. I then ran back to E1. E1A then told me to back up the truck. I took the truck out of pump gear and disconnected the jump line. As soon as I did this L3A requested water to the line to help protect the firefighters trying to extricate the victim who was trapped. I reconnected the jump line and began pumping to it and then with the assistance of E5B gained a water source from the hydrant at the corner of N Duke St and Main St. L3B who had positioned L3 parallel to E1, then requested water so they could put into place an elevated master stream. I hooked up supply hose to E1's 5" discharge and began nurse feeding L3. A two and a half

inch line was then requested by command. I assisted E10A and Sq4 in placing this line and hooking it up. After I charged this line the residual pressure dropped to 30 PSI. I informed B1 that I would need an additional water source if any more lines were to be added. E1A assisted with locating and bringing in another water source from a different hydrant and the residual pressure was then increased to 50 PSI. Conditions began to change in 111 N Duke and dark smoke began to come out of the roll up door beside E1. The front crosslay was then pulled off E1 by E5 and taken to the door to the left of the roll up door. I then charged it. E5 crew then went inside the structure to protect E1 and knock down any fire in the vicinity. Smoke conditions then changed to a less turbulent white smoke and E5 backed out shortly after. At this time E1A came to the pump panel and told me that command wanted the crews who were present at the time of the explosion off the scene to be evaluated. I told him that I was fine and wanted to keep working. He then replied that we have to go, it is an order from command. I then told him that I was not leaving until someone came and relieved me at the pump panel. Shortly after SQ1A came to the pump panel to take over pump operations. I told her the lines that I had in play and then met up with the remainder of the E1 crew and drove back to Station 1 in E12.

**Figure 5 depicts Engine One arriving and establishing a hoseline.**



**(all displayed times have a correction factor of -1h: 6mins)**

Engine 1's Firefighter Darren Wheeler's Verbal Summation as given on May 17, 2019 follows:

- Firefighter Wheeler was at Station 1 studying for the relief driver exam. The crew received a call for a gas leak. CAD notes for the call read "passerby who didn't stop."

- Engine 1 went to the area of Durham School of the Arts and nothing was found. Acting Captain Faucette attempted to obtain more information but there was no more to be provided. Engine 1 then circled the block around Durham School of the Arts and came back to Morgan Street. Nothing was found and they then cleared the call.
- Engine 1 returned to Station 1 and Firefighter Wheeler began studying again. A second call came in and an address of 115 North Duke Street was given.
- Once in the area of Main Street, the Engine apparatus was directed to 115 North Duke street by a worker and the gas could be smelled there. (Investigator Note: Worker referenced was identified as Don Smith of PS Splicing)
- Firefighter Patrick O'Reilly bump tested the gas monitor in the cab of the truck.
- Firefighter Patrick O'Reilly and Acting Fire Driver Skylar McEvoy entered the coffee shop.
- Firefighter Wheeler taped off Duke Street starting at Main Street.
- Firefighter Wheeler briefly entered the coffee shop where the owner was trying to talk the cashier into staying. Her response was "No, I am leaving."
- Firefighter Wheeler exited the coffee shop and returned back to the charged hose line on the ground near Engine 1. At this time, Acting Fire Driver McEvoy and Firefighter O'Reilly were out of his sight. Acting Captain Faucette was in and out of the coffee shop trying to convince the owner to stay outside.
- Acting Captain Faucette then exited the coffee shop and walked past E1. As he was walking by E1, he transmitted on his radio that he needed PD assistance with getting the owner out.
- The building then exploded. Firefighter Wheeler was knocked backwards into Engine 1. He had ringing in his ears and his body felt numb. Firefighter Wheeler then began to try to assess where and if he was injured.
- Firefighter Wheeler made it to the corner of Duke Street and Main Street and was met by fire personnel who began assessing and treating his injuries.

Figure 6 depicts Mr. Kong Lee while outside his business after Engine 1's arrival



(all displayed times have a correction factor of -1h: 6mins)

## NATURAL GAS DELIVERY SYSTEM MATERIALS

Through the decades, a variety of materials have been used to make natural gas pipelines. The selection of materials varies with the date the pipeline was placed in service, the diameter and pressurization requirements of the pipeline, and the characteristics of the local terrain. Listed below are the two types present at 115 North Duke Street.

- Plastic Pipe
  - The breached line gas line was  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch yellow plastic pipe service line, supplying a single gas meter in the front of the structure.
- Steel Pipe
  - The second gas line present was an abandoned steel pipe gas line capped off in the front of the structure adjacent to the in-service gas meter. PSNC/Dominion Energy confirmed this system to be out of service.

## FUEL SOURCE

The fuel source for the explosion was determined to be natural gas originating from a jagged breach in the 3/4-inch plastic underground gas service line. DFD personnel, utilizing an Altair gas meter, entered the front of Kaffeinate at 115 North Duke Street and conducted measurements from the front of the Kaffeinate coffee shop to the rear. In the interior of the structure, the E1 crew detected natural gas migrating into the structure and the meter read at 100% LEL. The probable gas migration path occurred through electrical, structural, and plumbing penetrations into the building. Evidence of natural gas in the structure was also directly observed by Mr. Lee, an additional Kaffeinate employee, Prescient staff, DFD personnel, and the cable boring crew. This fugitive gas was observed by smell and metering prior to the occurrence of the explosion. This observation and conclusion was confirmed through statements and video surveillance.

The natural gas flowed from the leak in the service line, through the ground, beneath the concrete and asphalt into the building and surrounding storm drains. The gas accumulated below the concrete and asphalt ground covering, restricting, and inhibiting vertical dissipation of the gas, and facilitating lateral travel of the gas toward and into the 115 North Duke Street building, adjacent buildings, and storm drains.

The “National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations” states:

*10.9.9.1.1 It is common for fuel gases that have leaked from underground piping systems to migrate underground (sometimes for great distances), enter structures, and create flammable atmospheres.*

*Both lighter-than-air and heavier-than-air fuel gases can migrate through soil; follow the exterior of underground lines; and seep into sewer lines, underground electrical or telephone conduits, drain tiles, or even directly through basement and foundation walls, none of which are as gastight as water or gas lines.*

*10.9.9.1.2 Such gases also tend to migrate upward, permeating the soil and dissipating harmlessly into the atmosphere. Whether the path of migration is lateral or upward is largely a matter of which path provides the least resistance to the travel of the fugitive gas, the depth at which the leak exists, the depth of any lateral buried lines that the gas might follow, and the nature of the surface of the ground.*

*If the surface of the ground is obstructed by rain, snow, frozen earth, or paving, the gases may be forced to travel laterally. It is not uncommon for a long-existing leak to have been dissipating harmlessly into the air until the surface of the ground changes, such as by the installation of new paving or by heavy rains or freezing, and then be forced to migrate laterally and enter a structure, fueling a fire or explosion.*

## CHEMICAL COMPOSITION

The exact composition of natural gas varies between gas fields. The primary component of natural gas is methane (CH<sub>4</sub>), the shortest and lightest hydrocarbon molecule. Natural gas as a

fossil fuel also contains heavier gaseous hydrocarbons such as ethane (C<sub>2</sub>H<sub>6</sub>), propane (C<sub>3</sub>H<sub>8</sub>) and butane (C<sub>4</sub>H<sub>10</sub>), as well as sulfur-containing gases in varying amounts. Nitrogen, carbon dioxide, trace amounts of hydrogen sulfide, water and odorants can also be present in natural gas.

Processed natural gas is tasteless and odorless. However, before natural gas is distributed to end-users, it is odorized by adding small amounts of thiols. Two types of odorants are t-butyl mercaptan, with a rotting cabbage-like smell, and thiophane, with a rotten-egg-like smell. Odorants are added to the otherwise colorless and odorless gas, so that leaks can be detected before a fire or explosion occurs. Processed natural gas is, in itself, harmless to the human body—however, natural gas is a simple asphyxiate and can displace the oxygen content of the air, enough where it will not support life.

Natural gas is lighter than air, so it tends to dissipate into the atmosphere. However, when confined within a structure, natural gas concentrations can reach explosive limits. Such mixtures, if ignited, result in blasts whose force can destroy buildings. Methane (the primary component of natural gas) has a lower explosive limit of 5 percent in air and an upper explosive limit of 15 percent. Natural gas maintaining concentrations between 5 percent and 15 percent in the presence of a competent ignition source, can trigger explosions.

## SOURCE OF IGNITION

The source of ignition of the fugitive gas that accumulated in the building at 115 North Duke Street was not conclusively determined; however, immediately prior to the explosion, Mr. Kong Lee was alone in the business and his actions cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor to the ignition source of this fugitive gas.

The “National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations” states:

*19.5.4 There may be multiple competent ignition sources in the area of origin with a known first fuel. A cause hypothesis can be developed in the absence of being able to state specifically which of these competent ignition sources ignited the known first fuel. Where propane leaks into a cellar, the standing Pilot on either the water heater or the furnace may have been the ignition source, however post-fire it may not be possible to definitively determine which of the two ignited the gas.*

**Figure 7 depicts ignition source temperature ranges.**

Source	Temperature (C)	Temperature (F)
Cigarettes - ventilated	400°-780°	<b>752°-1436°</b>
Cigarettes - unventilated conditions	288°	550.4°
Cigarettes - insulated and smoldering	510°-621°	<b>950°- 1149.8°</b>
Match	600°-800°	<b>1112°- 1472°</b>
Candle flame	600°-1400°	<b>1112°- 2552°</b>
Stove element	>550°	<b>&gt;1022°</b>

Fluorescent light	60°-80°	140°- 176°
Incandescent light	100°-300°	212°- 572°
Tungsten halogen light	600°-900°	<b>1112° - 1652°</b>
Electrical arcing	to 3750°	<b>to 6782°</b>
Electrical spark	1316°	<b>2400.8°</b>

*\*Gray Highlighting/Bold fields denote examples of competent ignition sources temperature ranges. Data compiled from multiple sources.*

Upper - lower flammable Limits, Upper – Lower explosive limits & ignition temperature				
Gas	UFL %	LFL %	Ignition Temperature (C)	Ignition Temperature (F)
Propane	9.6	2.15	466°	870.8
Butane	8.5	1.9	405°	761°
Natural gas	15	4.7	482°-632°	<b>899.6°- 1169.6°</b>
Natural gas	3.9% - 4.5% <b>(LEL)</b>	14.5%-15% <b>(UEL)</b>	482°-632°	899.6°- 1169.6°

## METER CHARACTERISTICS

The meters in use by the Durham Fire Department at the time of this incident were Altair 4x, RAE Lite, RAE Pro Plus, Sensit Gold G2 and Sensit HXG. All DFD engine companies are issued the Altair 4x meters. The only company that engaged and utilized its meter prior to the explosion was Engine 1.

All DFD multi-gas meters consist of an Oxygen, Carbon Monoxide (CO), Hydrogen Sulfide (H<sub>2</sub>S), and combustible sensor. Each meter is calibrated to a known quantity of Oxygen, CO, H<sub>2</sub>S and combustible gas. The Altair 4x is calibrated to pentane. All meters display a percent of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). Methane and natural gas are used synonymously, but are actually different compounds because methane is a single compound where natural gas is a mixture of flammable gases with methane being the main component. The other compounds that make up natural gas differ in concentration due to the area of origin which can result in different flammable ranges. It is widely accepted that the average or approximate flammable range of natural gas is 5% to 15%. The flammable range consists of a lower explosive limit (LEL) and an upper explosive limit (UEL). This means that between 0% to the LEL, the concentration is too lean and from the UEL to 100%, the concentration is too rich to cause an explosion. The area between the LEL and UEL limits is the flammable range where combustion can occur.

0% to 4%	5% to 15%	16% to 100%
TOO LEAN FOR COMBUSTION	FLAMMABLE	TOO RICH FOR COMBUSTION

The other sensor that is relative to flammable gas readings is Oxygen primarily because Oxygen must be present for combustion to occur. A minimum of 15% Oxygen is needed to facilitate flaming combustion. Another reason to meter the Oxygen present in the air is to estimate the total percentage of a gas present in the air based on the displacement of Oxygen. Oxygen makes

up 20.8% of the atmosphere which is approximately 1/5 of the atmosphere. The volume of a gas in the atmosphere can be estimated by calculating the displacement of Oxygen in the air (from 20.8%) and multiplying that figure by 5. This is a viable estimation as displacement by a gas is nonspecific to other gases; all gases are generally displaced at the same concentration.

**Example:** In responding to a natural gas leak, the Oxygen reading is 19.8%. This is a 1% drop or displacement. To estimate the volume of a certain gas in the atmosphere, 1 is multiplied by 5, totaling 5% volume of natural gas. As discussed above, 5% is the lower explosive limit (LEL) of natural gas. See the calculation below:

$$\begin{aligned} 20.8\% \text{ Oxygen in air} - 19.8\% \text{ meter reading} &= 1\% \text{ drop in Oxygen} \\ 1\% \text{ drop} \times 5 &= 5\% \text{ of the total atmosphere displaced} \end{aligned}$$

## SUMMATION OF FORMAL WITNESS INTERVIEWS

**B.J.**  
**Prescient Company**  
**May 6, 2019**

- BJ worked in a cubicle beside another employee (S.S.). On the day of the incident, B.J. smelled gas. Another employee (C.A.) came and asked if either of them could smell gas, to which they both replied "yes."
- They made an "informed decision" to evacuate.
- The employees exited towards Gregson Street and took the steps to Morgan Street.
- Once in the area of Morgan Street, B.J. along with the other employees, encountered a fire crew. The fire crew asked them if everyone was out of the building and they all replied "yes." The fire crew then asked if someone could let them inside the building to check. The crew was allowed in with someone's card access. They stayed inside several minutes and then exited.
- S.S. walked away prior to the crew exiting the building.
- B.J. indicated that she walked towards Duke Street & Gregson Street (Investigator's Note: These two streets run parallel and do not intersect. The interviewee may have confused the street names. From the context of this interview, it is the investigator's opinion that she walked towards Main Street and Gregson Street). C.A. and C.K. (another employee) walked towards the parking lot near Shooters II (nightclub).
- B.J. was approaching Gregson Street when she looked back at the building and saw the explosion occur.
- There was one big boom that sounded similar to a large firework and the ground shook.

**J.B.**  
**Prescient Company**  
**May 6, 2019**

- J.B. worked for Chevron for 37 years, and stated that he had a lot of training in chemicals, gas, LEL's, explosives, etc.

- At 0930 hours, C.A. came into his office and said "I smell gas. We should get out." J.B. exited his office and he could smell gas.
- J.B. had a 1000 hours conference call scheduled. J.B. began walking through the parking lot on the Gregson Street side and walked toward Parker & Otis to take his call. J.B. was able to see the fire engine upon coming out to Duke Street.
- A woman poked her head out of Ingram's and spoke briefly with J.B. about the gas leak. The woman also said "The facilities manager is behind you. Lets tell him too."
- J.B. told two workers on a bucket truck in the area of St. James Seafood that there was a gas leak and they should probably clear out.
- At approximately 0955 hours, J.B. decided to go home for the day. J.B. reached his car in the parking lot and drove away at approximately 1000 hours or a minute after.
- By 0958 hours J.B. had not encountered any fire, police, or EMS personnel on the Gregson Street side of the building. At this same time, J.B. texted the person he was scheduled to have a conference call with, got in his car, and spoke with that individual via bluetooth.
- J.B. was at home when D (HR employee) called him and advised him that the building had blown up.
- The day prior to the explosion, April 9, 2019, J.B. walked directly in front of Kaffeinate towards Main Street. At 1230 hours, in the area of Kaffeinate, J.B. noticed two workers digging separate holes in front of Kaffeinate with shovels. The holes were about two feet deep. J.B. then noticed a truck with three hispanic men wearing hats and vests, working across the intersection of Duke Street and Morgan Street headed towards Durham School of the Arts.
- J.B. passed back by Kaffeinate around 1430 hours on April 9, 2019 and did not see the men working in that location.
- J.B. stated that "In my opinion, there was NO reason for anyone to get hurt. We had 25 minutes to get out of the buildings. Mr. Lee made a fatal mistake by going back inside the building."

**R.J.  
Witness**

**May 16, 2019**

- R.J. is an interior designer by trade and was leaving a meeting the morning of April 10, 2019. She was travelling north on Duke Street.
- R.J. sat idle at the stoplight and was directly beside Engine 1. She observed a firefighter (Investigator's Note: determined to be Firefighter Darren Wheeler) standing about 6 feet away from her.
- At the time, the gas smell was so heavy that it was "making her sick."
- R.J. assumed the building that the workers were in front of was a restaurant, but she wasn't sure. R.J. observed a male subject wearing brown/khaki pants, brown belt, and a short sleeved shirt (Investigator's Note: determined to be Mr. Lee), walk to the front door and tape a neon green/yellow sign to the inside of the window and he then turned and walked back out of view inside the building.
- Several seconds later the light changed and she pulled off.

- About the time R.J. approached the other side of Morgan St., she heard the explosion. R.J. looked in her rear view mirror and there was a huge fireball on the sidewalk directly in front of the window that Mr. Lee had been standing in.

**C.A.**

**Prescient Company**

**May 6, 2019**

- C.A. was working at her desk when she smelled something that she thought was gas, but passed it off as sewage due to prior issues in the building. C.A. walked upstairs and smelled the odor virtually everywhere. C.A. checked the bathroom to check for a sewer issue and could smell nothing.
- C.A. spoke with S.S, B.J. and J.B. and asked if they smelled anything. They all answered that they did. They all gathered their belongings to evacuate the building. C.A. then called C.K. to see if she smelled the gas. C.K. initially said "no," but upon walking out of her office, she told her "Yes I do and it's really bad."
- They exited the office and went out via the Gregson Street side. They spoke with three men at the corner of Duke Street and Morgan Street that C.A. said sounded like "good 'ol southern boys". C.A. was advised that a gas line had been struck and that they would be able to go back inside soon. They were also approached by a woman who was "raising hell" because she was unable to get her coffee.
- C.A. returned to the back of the building with C.K., where they made a decision to work from home. A fire crew approached them and asked which business they worked for, to which C.A. replied, "Prescient." The fire crew then confirmed that everyone was out and accounted for, to which C.A. replied "yes." The fire crew requested to be badged into the building and C.K. let them in. The fire crew spent anywhere from two to six mintues inside the building.
- C.A. and C.K. decided to head home and as they crossed Morgan Street, the building blew up.
- C.A. said the explosion sounded like a rapid "boom boom boom" similar to large scale fireworks.

**R.P.**

**Prescient Company**

**May 6, 2019**

- R.P. was on a phone call with an ad agency. C.K. came in and told him that there was a "strong gas smell and they should get out".
- R.P left his office and went outside by way of the Morgan Street door and proceeded to the area of Morgan Street and Duke Street.
- At 0949 hours, R.P. called the ad agency back and talked for nine minutes.
- R.P. then decided he would make the rest of his calls from his apartment in West Village.
- R.P. went back in the building at 0958 hours and retrieved his briefcase and he exited again to head to his apartment.
- R.P. spoke to C.K. and asked her to help him with his phone because he had left his glasses.

- C.K. gave a fire crew access to the building to check for gas. They were inside for a couple of minutes and upon leaving, R.P. thinks they went into the clinic.
- R.P. dialed back in at 1001 hours and was walking along Morgan St. towards the cross walk at West Village.
- R.P. heard and felt the explosion. The windows of West Village blew out simultaneously. R.P. said the explosion was a loud “boom” similar to a large firework.
- R.P. turned and ran back towards the building. R.P. encountered two females who were crying and bleeding. R.P. continued to look for C.K. and C.A..
- R.P. located C.K. and C.A. in the area of Gregson Street and hugged them. There was a male casualty who was bleeding from the head lying near the lightpole.

**C.K.**

**Prescient Company**

**May 6, 2019**

- Around 0930 hours, C.K. went outside to retrieve a trash can. While outside, C.K. noticed a man inside of what she thought was a manhole with only his torso exposed.
- C.K. got a call from C.A. and C.A. asked her if she smelled gas. C.K. replied “No.” C.K. then walked out of her office and was able to smell the gas. C.A. instructed C.K. to call D from HR and advise D of the situation.
- D advised C.K. to dial 911. Upon calling 911, C.K. was advised that a fire crew was already at the location.
- C.K. exited the Gregson Street side and was not able to see any fire apparatus.
- C.K. walked to the intersection of Morgan Street and Duke Street and there she noticed the fire truck parked up the street “right before Kaffeinate.” There was already a perimeter set up with fireline tape.
- C.K. then went back into the building and went upstairs to tell C.A. that they needed to evacuate. Upon doing so, her co-workers got their belongings and exited.
- C.K. spoke with R.P. and advised him of the situation.
- C.K., C.A. and R.P. stayed inside briefly while everyone else was leaving, as they were expecting a 1000 hours conference call.
- C.K. returned back outside to the Morgan Street/Duke Street corner and spoke with three “construction workers.” One man was tall, thin and had dark hair. He advised her that someone had struck a gas line and that they would be able to go back inside in “three minutes.” While talking to this man, a “millennial” type young woman approached and she was “raising hell” about not being able to get coffee. One of the workers leaned back and looked towards Kaffeinate and replied to the young woman “He’s already put up a sign and they are closed.”
- Fire crews approached C.K. and asked her to badge them into the building so they could check it. The crew entered the building and returned a few minutes later.
- C.K. and C.A. debated whether or not to leave and just work from home. They decided to leave and work from home
- C.K. and C.A. then walked in the direction of Gregson Street by way of Morgan Street.
- C.K. then heard several “pop pop pop pops” to which she thought was gunfire. She then felt a “force” or a “wind tunnel” at their backs.

**S.S.**  
**Prescient Company**  
**May 6, 2019**

- S.S. was in the process of working on a presentation and all seemed normal. C.A. came over and asked her and B.J. if either of them could smell gas. They both responded that they could. C.A. then headed downstairs and S.S. continued to work. C.A. returned and informed S.S. and B.J. that the smell was worse downstairs and that they were going to evacuate.
- Upon evacuating the building, S.S. walked to The Residence Inn. Once at The Residence Inn, she heard an explosion.
- To S.S. the explosion sounded like a single “big bang”
- S.S. had experienced the “sugar factory” explosion in Savannah, GA and thought to herself, “Well the building just exploded.”

**L.B.**  
**Kaffeinate**  
**May 21, 2019**

- L.B. reported to work at approximately 0645-0650 hours and everything was completely normal until around 0915 hours.
- L.B. had performed her normal daily duties and the general morning “rush” came in between 0830 hours and 0900 hours.
- Between 0915 hours and 0920 hours, Mr. Lee went outside to talk to the workers about the noise they were making. L.B. said it sounded like “concrete stuff,” like a drill in concrete.
- Mr. Lee returned and said that the crew was installing Google Fiber.
- Around 0930 hours, the employees of Kaffeinate started smelling a gas smell that L.B. said smelled like “gasoline.” She indicated that the strength was a 4 on a scale of 1-10.
- Mr. Lee went back outside and talked to the construction crew. Mr. Lee told L.B. that the construction crew advised him that they had hit a gas line and they had called 911.
- Mr. Lee propped the front door open for a while, then closed it.
- Business continued with the gas smell present.
- At this point, the work crew had moved and was now in front of the shop and had taped off part of the sidewalk.
- A male patron commented, “That smells like gas.”
- Mr. Lee went back outside to speak to the crew, but L.B. was unsure of what was said. Mr. Lee returned and went to the back of the shop.
- At 0948 hours (09:48 am per L.B.), L.B. noticed that the fire department was outside. They were present for two to three minutes before speaking to anyone inside the coffee shop.
- Fire department personnel then came in and asked “how many people are inside?” which was six to eight customers plus the employees. The crew then told them that there was “no emergency, but everyone needs to leave.” This was said to them very strongly. Not many questions were asked by the patrons.

- The fire crew then asked them if the shop had anything that was “ignitable” or a “heat source” to which they replied that they had a waffle maker. The firefighters then asked Mr. Lee to unplug it, which he did.
- Mr. Lee and L.B. then provided the fire department with information on Prescient and the clinic and told the fire crew how they could access those businesses.
- L.B. then gathered her belongings and clocked out. She told Mr. Lee that she would wait at the corner until her shift ended which was 1030 hours. When she left, fire department personnel were still inside talking with Mr. Lee and there may have been a customer or two left inside, but she was unsure. She stated there was no reluctance from Mr. Lee or anyone else inside to leave and Mr. Lee did not direct her or anyone else to stay. At 0951-0952 hours, she was standing at the parking lot entrance on Morgan Street.
- There were workers on the corner of Duke Street and Morgan Street. She spoke to the workers and was told that it may take 45 minutes and that they were waiting on the gas company.
- It appeared that fire crews were around the back of the building talking to people from Prescient who were coming outside. She noticed a firefighter going inside the clinic building and employees coming out.
- L.B. then heard the explosion some minutes later and it sounded more like a “pooofffff” and not necessarily a “bang” or a “boom.”

**H.H.**

**Optic Cable Technology Inc.**

**May 8, 2019**

**(H.H.’s lawyer was present during the interview)**

- H.H. is the owner of Optic Cable Technology Inc., located at 5807 Wrenwood Court, Durham, NC. The company has been in business for approximately two years.
- Optic Cable Technology LLC employs 12-13 people.
- On the day of the incident, the following employees were on location: C.V. (Operator), W.L. (Locator) & E.S.(Helper). E.R. (Supervisor & Father of H.H.) was present after the gas line was struck.
- Crown Castle was the primary contractor for the project. Tower Engineering/Utilities was contracted by Crown Castle. Tower Engineering/Utilities then contracted PS Splicing, who then contracted with Optic Cable Technology LLC.
- The piece of machinery being used to bore was a 2006 Ditch Witch JT2020 which was being purchased by Optic Cable Technology LLC from PS Splicing LLC for \$60,000.00.
- Crews from Optic Cable Technology LLC were on site the day before, from 0730-1600 hours, spotting and checking depths in the area.
- Work started in the area of Duke Street and Main Street. at approximately 0730 hours on April 10, 2019.
- H.H. was at another jobsite in Wilmington when Cesar called at 0920 hours to tell him they had hit a gas line.
- H.H. then called his father/supervisor E.R. to let him know. E.R. indicated to H.H. that he would call Don Smith (PS Splicing LLC).

- The next phone call H.H. received was from E.S. who told him there had been an explosion.


## BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

The primary affected structure on 115 North Duke Street was a 2-story, adjoined building with primarily brick walls, hollow core clay tile floors (Figure 8), mixed wood-framed and steel-framed, drywall sheathed interior walls. The roof assembly consisted of open-web steel bar joists supported on steel beams and brick columns. The second floor above Kaffeinate was poured concrete on corrugated steel, supported by open-web steel bar joists supported on steel beams and columns, built sometime in 1920 (Durham County tax records). The original use of this building was an automotive dealership (Figure 9). The combined square footage of both adjoined buildings is 20,872 sq. ft. (Durham County tax records). The two buildings on this curtilage had been blended together through doors and cased openings. Kaffeinate occupied approximately 1,500 sq. ft. of the structure addressed as 115 North Duke Street. Prescient (115A North Duke Street) occupied the rear and upstairs portion directly above Kaffeinate and portions of the connected building. The first floor of the adjacent building 115 North Duke Street, Suite 1-B in Durham, NC (on the corner of Morgan and Duke Streets) was occupied by Main Street Clinical Associates (MSCA). The main entrance to this business was off of the courtyard behind the building.

**Figure 8 depicts the type of clay tile sub-floor in 115 North Duke Street**



**Figure 9 depicts the original use of 115 North Duke Street as a Studibaker dealership**




The front of the building (Kaffeinate) faced North Duke Street and was denoted the “Alpha (A)-side.” All reference to orientation of direction is clockwise from that cardinal point (Figure 10). It should be noted that this building had additional tenant space that utilized the rear and second floor of the primary structure and in the adjoined building through cased openings. Prescient and Main Street Clinical Associates was addressed as 115 (A and 1-B, respectively) North Duke Street, but the main entrance of both of their spaces was considered to be on the “Charlie (C) Side” of the structure in the rear court yard. Occupied exterior dimensions did not form a complete rectangle, but closely resembled an “L” shape. This area, if present, would not have any significant effect on the findings of this investigation and was not explored.

Those estimated dimensions were as follows in Figure 10:

- A-side (east), approximately 130'
- B-side (South), approximately 115'
- C-side (West Prescient), approximately 65'
- D-side (North Prescient), approximately 62'
- C-side (West MSCA), approximately 75'
- D-side (North MSCA), approximately 50'

Figure 10 denotes 115 North Duke Street orientation



On the “Bravo” (B-1) side of 115 North Duke was 111 North Duke Street. This structure was primarily brick walls, concrete floor, tile floors, mixed wood-framed and steel-framed, and drywall sheathed interior walls. The roof assembly consisted of open-web bowstring steel bar joists, supported on steel beams and brick columns. This structure was built circa 1949-1960.

The roof was wooden plank, built upon bowstring steel trusses, with the ridgeline running in an east-west orientation, covered in composite rolled roofing material. Two large garage-type metal roll-up doors were situated on the ground floor midline on the front and rear (east-west) of the structure, approximately 20' in width. Beside each roll-up door (positioned on the left side-Duke Street and right side-Gregson Street) was a single egress door that functioned as the entrance to the warehouse.

## ELECTRICAL SERVICE

On April 10, 2019, DFD investigators performed an examination in conjunction with NCSBI. The summary follows:

### Fixed Electrical Components Supplying the Structure:

Electrical service to the building was provided via an overhead service drop from a direct transformer located on the Alpha side of the structure. This transformer was located in the right-of-way near the building dividing walls of 111 and 115 North Duke Street. From the pole, conductors supplied a main electric service panel, protected by a 400-amp

breaker inside Kaffeinate. This service panel was positioned on the wall, just left of the entry door

**Figure 11 depicts the location of the electrical panel in Kaffeinate**



The following are observations of the aforementioned electrical service:

- The events that ignited the explosive gas mixture could not be conclusively contributed to an electrical event in this panel.
- This electrical system was **not** Class 1, Division 1 or Division 2 (explosion proof wiring).
- The visual examination of the entire panel configuration did not reveal obvious modifications to the electrical systems.
- It is possible the electrical system in Kaffeinate was operable prior to the explosion with no known defect or failure. This opinion is based on the business operating in its normal condition and statements of an employee to firefighters and investigators.

#### **Interior Fixed Electrical Systems of Building of Origin:**

In the building of origin located at 115 North Duke Street, electrical conduit containing insulated conductors and outlets were noted.

As part of the scene examination, efforts were made to examine the conductors from the conduit. This effort presented great challenges due to safety concerns and the use of heavy equipment. Of the components examined, there was no evidence of arc-melting on the conductors.

#### **Non-Fixed Interior Electrical Systems / Components within Building of Origin:**

Kaffeinate had several portable electrical appliances and some fixed appliances within its space.

Identified portable and fixed electrical appliances were removed and examined. These items included the following:


- An open top drink cooler
- Waffle irons
- Coffee machine
- Microwave
- Point of sale cash register

## INTERIOR CONDITIONS PRIOR TO FIRE

### Ground Floor:

The main entrance to Kaffeinate was a single glass door located at the Alpha Side near the Alpha, Bravo (A-B) corner of the building. This shop occupied an estimated 1,500 square feet with a glass store front. The interior configuration consisted of a service area of approximately 400 square feet located on the Bravo side (B-side) interior wall. This area had a Turbo air open display merchandiser refrigerator, waffle irons, microwave, dishwashers, point of sale cash register, and coffee brewing appliance. The rear had a small prep/storage area and bathroom adjacent to it. The seating area had numerous tables and chairs of various sizes and configurations located towards the midline and Delta side (D-Side) of the shop.

**Figure 12 denotes interior configuration of Kaffeinate**



There was a staircase and entry door located along the east wall at the front of the structure's "A" Side. These stairs entered the area of 115A North Duke Street, that was occupied by Prescient. These stairs were functional prior to the explosion and were noted to be used by C.K. Key of Prescient Company on the morning of the explosion. Prescient occupied a combined space

greater than 10,000 square feet in the two adjoined buildings. All observed systems and services were noted to have been in working order prior to the explosion.

**Figure 13 denotes stairwell entrance to Prescient**



## **EXTERIOR SCENE EXAMINATION**

A systematic approach was used throughout this process. Examination proceeded from the outside of the building to the inside and from areas having the least amount of damage to areas having heavier damage. There was an emphasis placed on recognition, identification and analysis of fire intensity and movement patterns in accordance with "NFPA 921 Guide to Fire and Explosion Investigations."

The exterior scene examination was conducted in a clockwise manner, starting at the front of the building that faced North Duke Street, denoted the Alpha side (East).

### Alpha/A-side of Structure/Front (East)

The front of the structure faced North Duke Street. The storefront of Kaffeinate was reduced to rubble with a gas fed fire. The two story exterior walls of 115-B North Duke St. remained intact with windows present, but no intact glass was present on either level. The exterior on the Bravo side had a collapse of its adjoining wall and connecting roof beam to 115 North Duke Street.

### Bravo/B-side Exposure Building

111 North Duke Street was examined. This is the adjoining structure on the Bravo side of the building of origin. Partial collapse and fire damage to this building occurred in an area at its northeast (Alpha/Bravo) corner. This damage matched the blast force between the two buildings. This damage caused the bowstring roof beams to collapse.

Additional buildings sustained damage from the blast force, but did not have any direct fire damage. These buildings will be noted, but no origin and cause examination was warranted for these spaces.

## INTERIOR SCENE EXAMINATION

### Overview:

The fire in the building of origin was extinguished by firefighters after a prolonged period of gas fed free-burning. During the fire, the roof was largely consumed. Parts of the roof that were not consumed were either knocked down into the structure by large quantities of water during the fire attack or they collapsed under their own weight. Fire and explosion damage throughout the building was extensive.

Comparative analysis of fire damage to the interior of the structure showed a greater degree of destruction to materials at the east (Alpha) end of the building. Based on fire patterns, fire damage, various media sources and witness statements, an area of origin was identified in the east (Alpha) area of the building known as Kaffeinate. Access to the east (Alpha) area of the building for investigators was only possible with the removal of debris by heavy equipment.

### Examination:

During every operational period from April 10, 2019 (this date's operational period started at the time of the incident) through April 12, 2019 (0700-1900 hours), Durham Fire Department Fire Investigators, NC State Bureau of Investigation, Durham County Fire Marshals' Office, and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Fire Investigators met to discuss how the scene was to be processed. The priority of victim recovery while simultaneously maintaining evidence for the origin and cause examination was considered and taken into account.

### The Following Plan was Developed:

After all emergency mitigation efforts were completed, a briefing was conducted for the purpose of transitioning to the investigation phase of the operation. This investigator had a face-to-face conversation with Chief Officers and stated objectives for the operation. The main objective began with complete documentation of the scene by various media platforms, e.g. digital photographs, drone footage and the like. Each element of this was disseminated to assisting members of the aforementioned investigative team. The next stated objective was identification and removal of the deceased victim (presumed) Mr. Lee. This objective was stated face-to-face with Durham Fire Department Division Chief Dan Cremeans. Personnel were allocated and equipment assembled to remove Fatality 1 from entrapment. The Durham Police Department identified the body and maintained chain of custody as it was removed, tagged and bagged for transport. The body was photographed and documented prior to transport to the State Medical Examiner's Office.

During the first operational period of this explosion, it was determined that there was a presumed presence of asbestos associated with this explosion. On April 11, 2019, members from North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services performed testing and recommended full protection. This protection consisted of Tyvek type suits and respiratory protection. This level of


protection required crews to operate in four-person teams working in one-hour intervals. Crew members were briefed of objectives and safety requirements and a safety officer was assigned to the Investigation Division.

The investigation plan required crew members to work in close proximity with excavators and loaders to move debris. The following operators from City of Durham Public Works Department were assigned to operate equipment:

Cary Brodie  
Mark Ferrell  
George Hunt  
Willie Jiles

The first operational period was to assist in moving debris to enable search dogs to access areas with collapsed roof sections. The excavation site was divided into three sections (Figure 14). These sections were labeled in a reverse order of (C, B, A). The purpose of this order was to identify debris as it was removed from the structure and placed in separate piles. This practice was continued for the duration of the excavation. At the completion of search efforts, the direction of the excavation changed.

**Figure 14 denotes debris examination areas**



The next investigation operational period started with briefings. All investigators were briefed on operational objectives. PSNC/Dominion energy representatives requested that investigators from Engineering Systems, Inc. (ESI) assist in locating and retrieving two items of evidential value to PSNC/Dominion energy: (1) the natural gas meter and (2) a hand held gas monitor used by the PSNC worker, Mr. Jay Rambeaut. This objective was agreed upon and the operation started with

a safety briefing for ESI employees. Three members of ESI were allowed to accompany investigation members for the purpose of retrieving aforementioned items.

A DFD drone was utilized to conduct overhead surveillance of the site. This assisted this investigator in determining areas requiring a detailed examination from least burned to most burned. Figure 14 (above) reveals area "C" having a large amount of burn in comparison to area "A". Shortly after the initial response, this was noted to be an area with a gas fed fire. This gave indication for a migration path of gas into the structure. The listed equipment operators were briefed on the investigational objectives. This objective continued for the duration of the excavation.

## **ANALYSIS OF FIRE/ EXPLOSION PATTERNS/ INDICATORS**

Within the structure, blast and fire patterns were examined and evaluated with respect to the characteristics of the materials involved. Each pattern was then evaluated in context and in relation to all of the patterns observed and the mechanisms of energy transfer that led to the formation of these patterns. The conclusion regarding origin is that the explosion originated at the east (Alpha) area of the first floor at 115 North Duke Street and the fire progressed throughout the building growing in size and intensity.

**Figure 15 denotes the explosion site moments after blast**



**Figure 16 denotes the natural gas fed fire of the A/B wall**



The following indicators, as referenced in “2017 NFPA 921,” which were documented with photographs and 3-D scans, are among those that support the findings in this report.

NFPA 921 references two major types of explosions, “Mechanical Explosions and Chemical Explosions.” These two types differ by the source or mechanism by which the blast overpressure is produced. The blast at 115 North Duke Street has been categorized as a Chemical explosion.

*23.2.3.1 In chemical explosions, the generation of overpressure is the result of exothermic reactions wherein the fundamental chemical nature of the fuel is changed. Chemical reactions of the type involved in an explosion usually propagate in a reaction front away from the point of initiation.*

Natural gas in its most basic terms is an identified chemical with flammable properties, and this was the first known fuel in the structure of Kaffeinate.

*23.2.3.1.1 Combustion explosion. The most common of the chemical explosions are those caused by the burning of combustible hydrocarbon fuels. These are combustion explosions and are frequently characterized by the presence of a fuel with air as an oxidizer. A combustion explosion may also involve dust. In combustion explosions, overpressures are caused by the rapid volume production of heated combustion products as the fuel burns*


Combustion explosions are classified as either deflagrations or detonations, depending on the velocity of the flame front propagation through the fuel air mixture. Deflagration is ordinary slow combustion (subsonic) and is propagated by heat transfer. Detonation is combustion that is propagated by a strong shock wave. A detonation is extremely fast (supersonic) and consequently violent.

Under certain conditions, a subsonic flame may accelerate to supersonic speed, transitioning from deflagration to detonation. Not fully understood is the exact mechanism, and while existing theories are able to explain and model both deflagrations and detonations, there is no theory at present, which can predict the transition phenomenon.

The shock wave effects of this explosion were wide spread. The damage to surrounding buildings, witness accounts and video footage confirmed the impact of the shock wave. NC Mutual Life Insurance Company reported shattered glass associated to the explosion. This building was located two tenths of a mile from the center of the blast. In explosions of structures where the rate of pressure rise is very rapid and is faster than the structure can respond to it, there will be more shattering of the confining vessel or container and debris will be thrown great distances, as the venting effects are not allowed sufficient time to develop. This is characteristic of high-order damage.

*23.3.2 High-order damage. High-order damage is characterized by shattering of the structure, producing small, pulverized debris. Walls, roofs, and structural members are splintered or shattered, with the building completely demolished. Debris is thrown great distances, possibly hundreds of feet. High order damage is the result of rapid rates of pressure rise.*

1. The sequential pattern analysis of the explosion effects and fire patterns, including char analysis, heat and flame effects analysis, and the movement and intensity patterns, indicate the detonation originated in Kaffeinate on the first floor of 115 North Duke Street. In explosion flame propagation, the fuel (natural gas in this example) encounters an ignition source, burning velocity acts in the same direction of flow as unburnt gases. A thin reaction zone/flame front travels through the unburnt gas-air mixture (Figure17). A large fire ball was associated with this explosion. This fireball is attributed to a buoyancy driven force resulting from a combusting vapor cloud. When a fire develops in a compartment, the products of combustion (i.e. heat, soot) begin to influence the materials within the compartment. Consequently, the lining materials for the walls, ceiling, and floor, as well as the various contents within the compartment, are damaged by their exposure to the products of combustion. The variety of damage to these objects is collectively known as fire effects.

**Figure 17 depicts propagation of an explosion flame**

“2017 NFPA 921” defines fire effects as “the observable or measurable changes in or on a material as a result of exposure to the fire.” The degree to which materials are influenced by the developing fire will be a function of the material characteristics, intensity of the products of combustion, and the duration of exposure.

As illustrated in Figures 15 and 16, the initial blast force was concentrated at or around Kaffeinate. Two areas had gas fed fires; one localized around the gas meter on the Alpha side the second was near the Bravo side approximately 30 feet in the rubble pile under the collapsed roof. The fire then grew in intensity and spread to collapsed structural members. This fire could not be easily extinguished because access to the seat of the fire was concealed and gas fed. This allowed lateral spread and notable fire effects to the remainder of the structure. The fugitive gas flowing to this fire was eliminated by PSNC/Dominion Energy at approximately 1110 hours (Appendix 1, line 13a).

The noted fire effects indicated a possible migration path of the fugitive gas in the structure and were examined. Investigators identified a concentrated burn area approximately 30 feet in the rubble on the Bravo wall. This area was marked and photographed by aerial drone photography (Figure 18). This area was considered a possible fugitive gas migration area.

**Figure 18 denotes a possible migration path of the fugitive gas**



2. A possible gas migration area was located approximately 30 feet along the Bravo wall. It is acknowledged that gas migrated underground and permeated 115 North Duke Street creating an explosive fuel air mixture. The structure's building elements created a moisture tight ensemble, but not vapor tight. There were numerous building components that could allow the fugitive gas to permeate this space.

Investigators observed an intense area of burn approximately 30 feet in the rubble along the Bravo wall in section "C" west of Duke Street (Figure 14). This area was identified as a utensil wash area, based on prints (Appendix 5). Investigators conducted a guided excavation of this site to the tile floor. This area was excavated with an excavator having a bucket and thumb attachment, which allowed items to be picked rather than pulled. The area revealed items consistent with a utensil wash room. Stainless steel sinks and tables were discovered as well as various stored items. One noted item was a portable propane tank. The tank had

damage and appeared that it was not in use. The tank was removed and placed adjacent to 710 West Main Street. Investigators continued to examine this area and revealed a sump/grease trap basin in the floor with no lid. This sump was plastic, blue in color and approximately 20 inches in circumference. Upon this discovery, investigators suspended the use of the excavator and continued removing debris by hand. A sump cover made of aluminum diamond tread plate was located approximately 3 feet east of the sump. Five attachment screws and anchors were still attached to the cover. The lid was concaved in a manner consistent with force being applied from the bottom of the lid. The force exerted on this lid had pushed all anchors out of the sump and retained them in the lid. The contents of the sump could not be examined at the time of its discovery. This investigator requested to examine the sump at a later time to confirm the hypothesis of a migration path for the fugitive gas in the structure. This investigator is aware of "Expectation Bias and Conformation Bias" as noted in Section 4.3.39 and 4.3.10 of "NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations," but could not continue to examine this sump. It was this investigator's request to conduct a smoke test of this sump to see a possible migration path for the fugitive gas. Fire Marshal Jody Morton solicited the opinion of an expert engineer from ATF and gave the following feedback:

*ATF Agent Edmunds contacted Interim Deputy Fire Marshal Gullie and I back this morning at 0925 hours after talking with an expert engineer at the ATF Lab. The engineer advised that we should not conduct a smoke test for the following reasons:*

- 1) You cannot replicate the conditions prior to the explosion*
- 2) A natural gas line has much more pressure than the smoke machine and therefore you cannot simulate the same pressure and type of gas at the time of the incident*
- 3) The engineer advised that conducting this type of test is a huge liability and would open up the city to additional scrutiny in regards to this case*
- 4) NFPA-921 only requires you as the lead investigator to document that you cannot conduct testing because you cannot replicate the conditions at the time of the incident*
- 5) The expert engineer from the ATF further stated that he worked a similar case 2 years ago and he would advise us to keep the fire investigation report vague and avoid in depth opinionated details*

This expert opinion provided the necessary documentation to render this sump as a "possible" migration path for the fugitive gas. As stated in "NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations:"

**4.5 Level of Certainty.** *The level of certainty describes how strongly someone holds an opinion (conclusion). Someone may hold any opinion to a higher or lower level of certainty. That level is determined by assessing the investigator's confidence in the data, in the analysis of that data, and testing of hypotheses formed. That level of certainty may determine the practical application of the opinion, especially in legal proceedings.*

**4.5.1** *The investigator should know the level of certainty that is required for providing expert opinions. Two levels of certainty commonly used are probable and possible:*

*(1) Probable. This level of certainty corresponds to being more likely true than not. At this level of certainty, the likelihood of the hypothesis being true is greater than 50 percent.*

*(2) Possible. At this level of certainty, the hypothesis can be demonstrated to be feasible but cannot be declared probable. If two or more hypotheses are equally likely, then the level of certainty must be “possible.”*

A migration path of this fugitive gas was determined to be the front door of Kaffeinate. This was corroborated by witness L.B. Batista, an employee of Kaffeinate, who stated that Mr. Lee propped the front door open. The amount of gas migrating through this door cannot be measured or tested. This door cannot be determined as a sole migration path and will be listed as a “possible” migration path.

## EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL IGNITION SOURCES

**Candles/Incense:** The use of candles and incense was examined as a possible heat source. No remains of candles or incense were found in the areas in general or in the area of origin. Due to the degree of destruction in the area of origin, the use of candles and/or incense cannot be eliminated.

**Smoking Materials:** The use of smoking materials was considered as a possible heat source of the explosion. Mr. Lee was identified smoking outside on North Duke Street during the gas leak. It is noted that Mr. Lee had smoking materials in his possession. A red cigarette butt can was located within the area of origin. This was located at the entrance of Prescient on North Duke Street. No occupants were identified smoking or using smoking materials in the area of origin before the explosion. No remains of smoking materials were found during the scene investigation. Due to the degree of destruction in the area of origin, smoking materials cannot be eliminated.

**Natural Gas Systems:** According to Dominion Energy, 115 North Duke Street had two duct furnaces. These furnaces could not be examined but were visualized in the debris piles. The location and working condition of these appliances could not be confirmed, but both were considered to be rooftop units based on the remaining structural elements.

**Propane Systems:** A portable propane tank was observed on the first floor, but it was not within the area of origin. No portions or components of a propane system were found within the area of origin. Propane systems and appliances can be eliminated as a potential heat source.

**Intentionally Introduced Heat Source:** Criminal activity was considered as a possible cause of the ignition, but the scene investigation did not reveal any indications of an intentional ignition

source. Interviews did not reveal any motives for an intentionally set fire. First floor occupants near the area of origin prior to the discovery of the explosion reported that there were no unauthorized persons in that area; however, the introduction of an open flame, either intentionally or carelessly, cannot be eliminated.

**Electrical Systems:** Throughout the structure, the electrical system was presumed to be in working condition. This is based on historical pictures and witness statements. Numerous identified electrical appliances were noted in operation on April 10, 2019. These items were normal for this type of business and posed no abnormal risk. It should be noted that the entire electrical system and associated appliances were not designed to operate in a flammable gas environment. It is well known that electrical appliances, wiring and fixtures, designed to operate in explosive environments are designed to be intrinsically safe and wiring must be Class 1-Division 1 or Class 1-Division 2. None of the electrical system or components in this space met these design specifications. Due to the nature of the electrical supply within the building and electrical appliances, a fault or failure of these items cannot be eliminated.

## EVIDENCE

Digital photographs, 3-D scans, and drone video, were taken by Investigators from the Durham Fire Department, Durham Police Department, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, and evidence technicians of the Durham Police Department.

Two items of physical evidence were collected; (1) a PSNC ball cap and (2) a North Carolina vehicle registration plate. These items were located on the second floor of the Duke Research building, east of the building of origin. These items were approximately 200 feet from their presumed location of origin. DFD Investigator Brandon Link secured these items until they could be collected by Durham PD Forensics.

The following narrative excerpt was provided by Investigator Brandon Link:

I was approached by the Major from Duke University Police who advised me that I may want to come to the second floor of 710 W. Main Street (Duke University leases this building for research purposes) and take a look at something. I asked Agent Bode of the SBI to accompany me in case what we were looking at needed to be photographed. Once we were on the second floor, the Major from Duke PD pointed out that there was a PSNC ball hat inside a cubicle space. Given that one of the severely injured victims was in fact, a PSNC employee and that huge implications existed due to the nature of the event, I decided to have Agent Bode photograph the hat and I collected it. The item was placed inside a paper bag and sealed. While looking around, a deformed license plate was also found. The license plate from the PSNC truck was missing and the assumption was made that this could be from the PSNC truck as well. Again, Agent Bode photographed the license plate and I collected that as well. The plate was placed inside a clear plastic bag and sealed. Once we

completed evidence collection in the 710 building, I made contact with a Durham PD officer who was on scene. The officer called his supervisor and was instructed to take custody of the evidence from me until a forensic investigator arrived. Upon arrival, the forensic investigator took custody of it. Once the evidence was turned over to Durham PD, I returned back to the scene.

Digital evidence was collected in the form of video surveillance from 111 North Duke Street and Carolina Livery. This evidence was obtained and provided through verbal consent of its owners. This digital material was provided on two Scan Disk thumb drives. This has remained in the custody of Durham Fire Department and has been maintained in its original state.

Additional open source digital imagery from; Snap Chat, Facebook, Yelp, Google, and Yahoo were utilized in various methods.

## **FATALITIES:**

There were 2 fatalities associated with this fire. The victims' legal names are listed below.

### Fatality 1 (as provided by Medical Examiner)

Name:

Kong Lee

2976 Tillinghast Trl.

Raleigh, NC

Probable cause of death "multiple blunt force injuries"

### Fatality 2 (as provided by PSNC/Dominion Energy)

Name:

Jay Gordon Rambeaut

DOB: May 17, 1967

Work Address: 1315 Old Oxford Rd, Durham, NC.

Job Title: Locator First Responder 1 Durham Construction and Maintenance Department

A complete autopsy report (Appendix 6) was provided for Mr. Kong Lee. The autopsy was conducted by Medical Examiner Mark Oniffrey of North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Case Number 19-3846.

## **KNOWN INJURED**

### Information provided by Duke Health System and Durham County EMS

GENDER	AGE
Female	48

Female	61
Male	48
Male	35
Male	25
Female	12
Female	42
Female	44
Male	30
Male	27
Male	36
Male	39
Female	30
Male	45
Female	46
Female	26
Female	47
Male	28
Male	65
Female	23
Male	38
Female	47
Male	45
Male	24

## CAUSE DETERMINATION

“NFPA 921” defines the cause of a fire or an explosion as:

**3.3.26 Cause** *the circumstances, conditions, or agencies that brought about or resulted in the fire or explosion incident, damage to property resulting from the fire or explosion incident, or bodily injury or loss of life resulting from the fire or explosion incident.*

For an explosion to occur, four elements must be present:

1. Fuel, (e.g. a combustible dust, flammable gases or vapor)
2. An ignition source
3. An oxidizing agent, which in most occurrences is the oxygen in the air
4. Confinement, which results in pressure buildup during the incipient explosion.

It is confirmed in this investigation that all four of these elements came together to form the combustion explosion causing high-order damage to 115 North Duke street and surrounding structures.

**Fuel:** The first known fuel was fugitive natural gas from a 3/4-inch service line breached by Optic Cable Technology LLC. This gas was metered and had reached 100% of its LEL.

**Oxidizing Agent:** The known oxidizing agent, oxygen, was found in the air; this level was metered at 19.7%.

**Confinement:** Natural gas having a vapor density of 0.7-0.9kg/m<sup>3</sup> indicates that it is lighter than air and will dissipate if not confined. The fugitive gas in this incident was confined to 115 N Duke Street.

**Ignition Source:** All these aforementioned elements then found a competent ignition source in the confinement of Kaffeinate. As noted, natural gas has a very low ignition energy requirement and subsequently can be ignited from most *normally* present ignition sources located within occupied structures. (Figure 7).

It is well understood that part of a causation determination includes an ignition sequence analysis. It is outlined that all potential ignition sources in the area of origin be determined if they are competent. This investigation identified competent ignition sources in the area of origin however; this list is not conclusive, but inferred based on physical characteristics of this explosion. The acts or omissions that allowed these elements to come together to form a fugitive gas leak, confinement of said gas, and subsequent explosion have been concluded. Mr. Lee was the last person in the area of origin moments before the explosion. This investigation could not conclusively determine his actions as a contributor to the ignition sequence; however, the ignition source can be inferred as stated in “NFPA 921” section 19.4.4.3 section A.

## CONCLUSION

Natural gas has a very low ignition energy requirement and subsequently can be ignited from most *normally* present ignition sources located within buildings (Figure 7). If there is an explosive concentration of fugitive natural gas in a building, it is very difficult to avoid contact with *normally* present ignition sources. In this incident, it is known that the fugitive natural gas had reached 100% of its Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). Subsequently, the potential for this disastrous explosion was substantial.

On April 10, 2019, Optic Cable Technology LLC was conducting a permitted horizontal boring operation in the area of 111 North Duke Street. At 0745 hours, a single crew member arrived with a white Ford F450, pulling a trailer. A 2006 Ditch Witch JT2020 was on the trailer. At 0755 hours, a three-member crew from Optic Cable Technology LLC removed the Ditch Witch JT2020 from the trailer and began setting up to start the boring. Crew members conducted several tasks prior to beginning the boring operation. At 0850 hours, the boring operation started with an operator on the Ditch Witch. A second crew member used a hand held tracking device and a third member was hand digging at the drill head. At 0856 hours, the tracker operator had progressed approximately 50 feet with the tracking device. It is assumed that this is the location of the bit. According to video footage, at 0858 hours, it was noted the the worker gave a hand motion to the operator; this is assumed as a guidance indicator.

At approximately 0906 hours, the gas line was struck and boring was stopped. The two workers returned to the Ditch Witch moments after the line strike. At approximately 0907 hours, Mr. Lee was at the Ditch Witch speaking with workers about the gas leak; this was based on his gestures of a smell and pointing towards his shop (Kaffeinate). The first call for service occurred at approximately 0911 hours and was stated as originating from 401 North Duke Street. This call was made by Yolanda Watson as she drove north on North Duke Street. Ms. Watson explained that while sitting in traffic between Main and Morgan Street, waiting for the light to change, the smell of gas “engulfed” her car with all the windows up. Ms. Watson further explained that as she began to drive towards Morgan Street, the smell continued to be prevalent and she did not know the source of the smell. At this time, Ms. Watson called the Durham 911Center from her cell phone to report the smell. Based on this 911 call, DFD E1 was dispatched to 401 North Duke Street for a Gas Leak/Odor call, Report # 19-09571.

At approximately 0918 hours, an additional employee, Enrique Reyes, of Optic Cable Technology, LLC, arrived on the scene. Shortly after his arrival, crew members placed additional cones and signs around the leak site. At approximately 0937 hours, Don Smith, owner of PS Splicing LLC, was on North Duke street and reported to have called 811 and 911 to report the gas leak. (Appendix 3) - Gas Leak/Odor call, Report # 19-09574.


At approximately 0940 hours, DFD E1 arrived to the reported gas leak in the area of 115 North Duke Street (known as Kaffeinate). E1’s crew encountered Don Smith (owner of PS Splicing, LLC) at the intersection of North Duke Street and Main Street. Mr. Smith directed the crew to the leak location. E1 was positioned on North Duke Street and began assessment, monitoring, and evacuation of occupants from affected structures. Firefighters entered Kaffeinate shortly after arrival on scene to meter and evacuate this business. The metered conditions in the coffee shop read 100% of LEL. It was reported that crew members faced resistance from Mr. Lee to exit the building as customers and staff evacuated. Crew members radioed this information to their captain and proceeded to the next occupancy. This gas was documented to have flowed from approximately 0906-1006 hours before the explosion, and continued to flow until 1110 hours, when it was then shut off by PSNC/Dominion Energy. An estimated 46,000 cubic feet of gas was released during this incident. At approximately 1006 hours, a large explosion with a total building collapse and fire occurred at 115 North Duke Street.

This incident caused various injuries and two fatalities. The first fatality occurring moments after the blast, was attributed to the failure to act by Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee knew of this gas leak at 0907 hours, approximately 59 minutes before the deadly explosion and 33 minutes before the fire department arrived. DFD personnel had directed total evacuation after monitoring 100% LEL in Kaffeinate. After the explosion, Mr. Lee was trapped under a large I beam in the front of the structure. This beam was approximately 10 feet west of the entrance, and spanned the width of the structure. This beam was a main support beam of the second floor. The second fatality, Mr. Rambeaut, who arrived moments before the explosion and was located outside of Kaffeinate; he was performing his duties as a responder. The blast force projected him an estimated 20 feet from his pre-explosion location. Based on the Livery video, two additional critically injured victims were located on North Duke Street; Don Smith of PS Splicing LLC and Enrique Reyes of Optic Cable Technology LLC. Both victims were projected 20 to 30 feet from their pre-explosion locations.

Based on the application of the scientific method through fire scene examination, witness statements, fire personnel, and technical data provided, it is my determination that the area of origin was at or about the interior of Kaffeinate on the "A" side of the structure, and the cause is ruled as accidental. The circumstances and conditions of this explosion and fire causation are determined as an unintentional human act. Other reasonable explosion and fire causes have been eliminated through this investigation. It is my conclusion that the breach of the gas line by Optic Cable Technology LLC allowed fugitive natural gas to create an explosive fuel air mixture. This fuel air mixture encountered a competent ignition source in the area of origin. This ignition source caused the explosion in the building of origin.

The cause of this explosion/fire is "Accidental," and in accordance with "NFPA 921," the cause of this explosion/fire is categorized as "Accidental." This investigator reserves the right to amend or supplement this report as new or additional information becomes available.

Brian Graves, CFI

  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
Lead Fire Investigator

## APPENDICES



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Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574

April 10, 2019

Appendix 1

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Brian Graves  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2nd, 2019

<p>NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed \$1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.</p>		OMB NO: 2137-0522 EXPIRATION DATE: 8/31/2020																						
 <p>U.S Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration</p>		<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Original Report Date:</td> <td>05/10/2019</td> </tr> <tr> <td>No.</td> <td>20190049-32113</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">(DOT Use Only)</td> </tr> </table>	Original Report Date:	05/10/2019	No.	20190049-32113	(DOT Use Only)																	
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<b>INCIDENT REPORT - GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM</b>																								
<p>A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding the burden or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHS-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.</p>																								
<b>INSTRUCTIONS</b> <p><i>Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at <a href="http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms">http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms</a>.</i></p>																								
<b>PART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION</b>																								
Report Type: (select all that apply)		<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Original:</td> <td>Supplemental:</td> <td>Final:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Yes</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Original:	Supplemental:	Final:	Yes																		
Original:	Supplemental:	Final:																						
Yes																								
Last Revision Date																								
1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 15938																								
2. Name of Operator: PUBLIC SERVICE CO OF NORTH CAROLINA																								
3. Address of Operator: <table border="1"> <tr> <td>3a. Street Address: 800 GASTON ROAD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3b. City: GASTONIA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3c. State: North Carolina</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3d. Zip Code: 28056</td> </tr> </table>			3a. Street Address: 800 GASTON ROAD	3b. City: GASTONIA	3c. State: North Carolina	3d. Zip Code: 28056																		
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4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 04/10/2019 10:06																								
5. Location of Incident: <table border="1"> <tr> <td>5a. Street Address or location description: 115 N Duke Street</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5b. City: Durham</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5c. County or Parish: Durham</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5d. State: North Carolina</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5e. Zip Code: 27701</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5f. Latitude: 35.59599</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Longitude: -78.54286</td> </tr> </table>			5a. Street Address or location description: 115 N Duke Street	5b. City: Durham	5c. County or Parish: Durham	5d. State: North Carolina	5e. Zip Code: 27701	5f. Latitude: 35.59599	Longitude: -78.54286															
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6. National Response Center Report Number: 1242352																								
7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the National Response Center: 04/10/2019 11:17																								
8. Incident resulted from: Unintentional release of gas																								
9. Gas released: <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- Other Gas Released Name:</td> </tr> </table>			- Other Gas Released Name:																					
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10. Estimated volume of gas released - Thousand Cubic Feet (MCF): 46,000																								
11. Were there fatalities? <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- If Yes, specify the number in each category:           <table border="1"> <tr> <td>11a. Operator employees: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11e. General public: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11f. Total fatalities (sum of above): 2</td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3"> 12. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- If Yes, specify the number in each category:           <table border="1"> <tr> <td>12a. Operator employees: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12e. General public: 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12f. Total injuries (sum of above): 5</td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3"> 13. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Incident? <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- If No, Explain:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>- If Yes, complete Questions 13a and 13b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)</td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> </table> </td></tr></table>			- If Yes, specify the number in each category: <table border="1"> <tr> <td>11a. Operator employees: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11e. General public: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11f. Total fatalities (sum of above): 2</td> </tr> </table>	11a. Operator employees: 1	11b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0	11c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 0	11d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 0	11e. General public: 1	11f. Total fatalities (sum of above): 2	12. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- If Yes, specify the number in each category:           <table border="1"> <tr> <td>12a. Operator employees: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12e. General public: 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12f. Total injuries (sum of above): 5</td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3"> 13. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Incident? <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- If No, Explain:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>- If Yes, complete Questions 13a and 13b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)</td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> </table>			- If Yes, specify the number in each category: <table border="1"> <tr> <td>12a. Operator employees: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12e. General public: 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12f. Total injuries (sum of above): 5</td> </tr> </table>	12a. Operator employees: 0	12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator: 0	12c. Non-Operator emergency responders: 1	12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator: 2	12e. General public: 2	12f. Total injuries (sum of above): 5	13. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Incident? <table border="1"> <tr> <td>- If No, Explain:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>- If Yes, complete Questions 13a and 13b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)</td> </tr> </table>			- If No, Explain:	- If Yes, complete Questions 13a and 13b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)
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13a. Local time and date of shutdown:	04/10/2019 11:10
13b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)	Yes
14. Did the gas ignite?	No
15. Did the gas explode?	Yes
16. Number of general public evacuated:	10
17. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):	
17a. Local time operator identified Incident - effective 10-2014, "Incident" changed to "failure"	04/10/2019 09:35
17b. Local time operator resources arrived on site:	04/10/2019 10:03

#### PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION

1. Was the Incident on Federal land?	No
2. Location of Incident	Public property
3. Area of Incident: Specify: If Other, Describe:	Underground Under pavement
4. Did Incident occur in a crossing? - If Yes, specify type below:	No
- If Bridge crossing – Cased/ Uncased:	
- If Railroad crossing – Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled	
- If Road crossing – Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled	
- If Water crossing – Cased/ Uncased	
Name of body of water (if commonly known):	
Approx. water depth (ft):	

#### PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION

1. Indicate the type of pipeline system: - If Other, specify:	Investor Owned
2. Part of system involved in Incident: - If Other, specify:	Service
2a. Year "Part of system involved in Incident" was installed:	2008
3. When "Main" or "Service" is selected as the "Part of system involved in Incident" (from PART C, Question 2), provide the following:	
3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):	.75
3b. Pipe specification (e.g., API 5L, ASTM D2513):	ASTM D2513
3c. Pipe manufacturer:	Performance
3d. Year of manufacture:	Unknown
4. Material involved in Incident: - If Other, specify:	Plastic
4a. If Steel, Specify seam type:	None/Unknown?
4b. If Steel, Specify wall thickness (inches):	
4c. If Plastic, Specify type: - If Other, describe:	Polyethylene (PE)
4d. If Plastic, Specify Standard Dimension Ratio (SDR): Or wall thickness:	11
4e. If Polyethylene (PE) is selected as the type of plastic in Part C, Question 4.c: - Specify PE Pipe Material Designation Code (i.e. 2406, 3408, etc.)	2406
5. Type of release involved : - If Mechanical Puncture - Specify Approx size: Approx. size: in. (axial): in. (circumferential):	Mechanical Puncture 2.00 .80
- If Leak - Select Type: - If Other, Describe:	
- If Rupture - Select Orientation: - If Other, Describe: Approx. size: (widest opening): (length circumferentially or axially):	
- If Other - Describe:	

#### PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION

1. Class Location of Incident :	Class 3 Location
2. Estimated Property Damage :	
2a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 6-2011, "paid/reimbursed by the Operator" removed	\$ 20,000,000
Estimated cost of gas released – effective 6-2011, moved to item 2f	
2b. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs	\$ 7,638
2c. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response	\$ 15,467
2d. Estimated other costs	\$ 0
- Describe:	Unknown. Investigation is ongoing.
2e. Property damage subtotal (sum of above)	\$ 20,023,105

#### Cost of Gas Released

2f. Estimated cost of gas released	\$ 196
Total of all costs	\$ 20,023,301
3. Estimated number of customers out of service:	
3a. Commercial entities	20
3b. Industrial entities	0
3c. Residences	0

#### PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION

1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig):	58.00
2. Normal operating pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig):	58.00
3. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and time of the Incident (psig):	60.00
4. Describe the pressure on the system relating to the Incident:	Pressure did not exceed MAOP
5. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident?	Yes
- If Yes:	
5a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident?	Yes
5b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident?	Yes
5c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the detection of the Incident?	No
5d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Incident?	No
6. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator?	Other
- If Other, Specify:	notification from excavator via their NC-811 notification
6a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel, Including contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Ground Patrol by Operator or its contractor" is selected in Question 6, specify.	
7. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the Incident?	No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not investigate)
- If "No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:" (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)	While there are two SCADA monitoring points on the distribution system, both are located on larger diameter feeder mains approximately 2 miles upstream; the volume of gas lost was inconsequential vs. the line-pack and delivery capacities in these feeder mains such that there was not a significant or correlating resultant pressure drop at these points.
- If Yes, Specify investigation result(s) (select all that apply):	
- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue	
- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue	
- Provide an explanation for why not:	
- Investigation identified no control room issues	
- Investigation identified no controller issues	
- Investigation Identified Incorrect controller action or controller error	
- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response	
- Investigation identified incorrect procedures	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation</li> <li>- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response</li> <li>- Investigation identified areas other than those above</li> </ul>	
Describe:	

#### PART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION

1. As a result of this incident, were any Operator employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?	No
- If Yes:	
1a. How many were tested:	
1b. How many failed:	
2. As a result of this incident, were any Operator contractor employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?	No
- If Yes:	
2a. How many were tested:	
2b. How many failed:	

#### PART G - CAUSE INFORMATION

Select only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the Apparent Cause of the Incident, and answer the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).

Apparent Cause:	G3 - Excavation Damage
<b>G1 - Corrosion Failure</b> – only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column	
Corrosion Failure Sub-Cause:	
- If External Corrosion:	
1. Results of visual examination:	- If Other, Specify:
2. Type of corrosion:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Galvanic</li> <li>- Atmospheric</li> <li>- Stray Current</li> <li>- Microbiological</li> <li>- Selective Seam</li> <li>- Other</li> </ul>	
- If Other, Describe:	
3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Field examination</li> <li>- Determined by metallurgical analysis</li> <li>- Other</li> </ul>	
- If Other, Describe:	
4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?	
- If Yes:	
4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at the time of the incident?	
- If Yes, Year protection started:	
4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the point of the incident?	
4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the incident?	
If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted:	
- If No:	
4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?	
5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion?	
6. Pipeline coating type, if steel pipe is involved:	- If Other, Describe:
- If Internal Corrosion:	
7. Results of visual examination:	- If Other, Describe:
8. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):	

- Corrosive Commodity	
- Water drop-out/Acid	
- Microbiological	
- Erosion	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
9. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 8 is based on the following: (select all that apply):	
- Field examination	
- Determined by metallurgical analysis	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
10. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):	
- Low point in pipe	
- Elbow	
- Drop-out	
- Other	
- If Other, Describe:	
11. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inhibitor or biocides?	
12. Were any liquids found in the distribution system where the Incident occurred?	
Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Part of system involved in incident" (from PART C, Question 2) is Main, Service, or Service Riser.	
13. Date of the most recent Leak Survey conducted	
14. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure:	

**G2 – Natural Force Damage** – only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column

Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:	
- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:	
1. Specify:	- If Other, Specify:
- If Heavy Rains/Floods:	
2. Specify:	- If Other, Specify:
- If Lightning:	
3. Specify:	
- If Temperature:	
4. Specify:	- If Other, Specify:
- If Other Natural Force Damage:	
5. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.	
6. Were the natural forces causing the incident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event?	
6.a If Yes, specify (select all that apply):	
- Hurricane	
- Tropical Storm	
- Tornado	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	

**G3 – Excavation Damage** – only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column

Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause:	Excavation Damage by Third Party
- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete the following ONLY IF the "Part of system involved in Incident" (from Part C, Question 2) is Main, Service, or Service Riser.	
1. Date of the most recent Leak Survey conducted	
2. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure:	

Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected.	
3. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?	Yes
3a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply):	
- One-Call System	Yes
- Excavator	
- Contractor	
- Landowner	
Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.	
4. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-DIRT ( <a href="http://www.cga-dirt.com">www.cga-dirt.com</a> )?	No
5. Right-of-Way where event occurred (select all that apply).	
- Public	Yes
- If Public, Specify: City Street	
- Private	
- If Private, Specify:	
- Pipeline Property/Easement	
- Power/Transmission Line	
- Railroad	
- Dedicated Public Utility Easement	
- Federal Land	
- Data not collected	
- Unknown/Other	
6. Type of excavator	Contractor
7. Type of excavation equipment	Directional Drilling
8. Type of work performed	Telecommunications
9. Was the One-Call Center notified?	Yes
9a. If Yes, specify ticket number.	190931483
9b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center exists list the name of the One-Call Center notified:	
10. Type of Locator	Contract Locator
11. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?	Yes
12. Were facilities marked correctly?	Unknown/Other
13. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?	Yes
13a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption:	
14. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):	
- Root Cause Description:	
- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	Other
- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:	
- If Other/None of the Above, explain:	Investigation is ongoing
<b>G4 - Other Outside Force Damage</b> - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Other Outside Force Damage - Sub-Cause:	
- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:	
1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:	
- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost Their Mooring:	
2. Select one or more of the following if an extreme weather event was a factor:	
- Hurricane	
- Tropical Storm	
- Tornado	
- Heavy Rains/Flood	
- Other	
- If Other, Specify:	
- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation: Complete the following ONLY IF the "Part of system involved in Incident" (from Part C, Question 2) is Main, Service, or Service Riser.	
3. Date of the most recent Leak Survey conducted:	
4. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the incident?	
- If Yes:	
Most recent year tested:	
Test pressure (psig):	
- If Intentional Damage:	

5. Specify:	- If Other, Specify:
- If Other Outside Force Damage:	
6. Describe:	
<b>G5 - Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure</b> - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
Pipe, Weld or Joint Failure – Sub-Cause:	
- If Body of Pipe:	
1. Specify:	- If Other, Describe:
- If Butt Weld:	
2. Specify:	- If Other, Describe:
- If Fillet Weld:	
3. Specify:	- If Other, Describe:
- If Pipe Seam:	
4. Specify:	- If Other, Describe:
- If Mechanical Fitting:	
5. Specify the mechanical fitting involved:	- If Other, Describe:
6. Specify the type of mechanical fitting:	- If Other, Describe:
7. Manufacturer:	
8. Year manufactured:	
9. Year Installed:	
10. Other attributes:	
11. Specify the two materials being joined:	
11a. First material being joined:	- If Other, Specify:
11b. If Plastic, specify:	- If Other Plastic, specify:
11c. Second material being joined:	- If Other, Specify:
11d. If Plastic, specify:	- If Other Plastic, Specify:
12. If used on plastic pipe, did the fitting – as designed by the manufacturer – include restraint?	
12a. If Yes, specify:	
- If Compression Fitting:	
13. Fitting type:	
14. Manufacturer:	
15. Year manufactured:	
16. Year installed:	
17. Other attributes:	
18. Specify the two materials being joined:	
18a. First material being joined:	- If Other, specify:
18b. If Plastic, specify:	- If Other Plastic, specify:
18c. Second material being joined:	If Other, specify:
18d. If Plastic, specify:	- Other Plastic, specify:
- If Fusion Joint:	
19. Specify:	- If Other, Specify:
20. Year Installed:	
21. Other attributes:	
22. Specify the two materials being joined:	
22a. First material being joined:	- If Other, Specify:
22b. Second material being joined:	

- If Other, Specify: _____	
<b>- If Other Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure:</b> 23. Describe: _____ Complete the following if any Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure sub-cause is selected.	
<b>24. Additional Factors (select all that apply):</b> - Dent - Gouge - Pipe Bend - Arc Burn - Crack - Lack of Fusion - Lamination - Buckle - Wrinkle - Misalignment - Burnt Steel - Other	
- If Other, Specify: _____	
<b>25. Was the Incident a result of:</b> - Construction defect - Material defect - Design defect - Previous damage	
<b>26. Has one or more pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Incident?</b> - If Yes: Most recent year tested: _____ Test pressure: _____	
<b>G6 - Equipment Failure</b> - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
<b>Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause:</b>	
<b>- If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment:</b>	
1. Specify: - Control Valve - Instrumentation - SCADA - Communications - Block Valve - Check Valve - Relief Valve - Power Failure - Stopple/Control Fitting - Pressure Regulator - Other	
- If Other, Specify: _____	
<b>- If Threaded Connection Failure:</b>	
2. Specify: - If Other, Specify: _____	
<b>- If Non-threaded Connection Failure:</b>	
3. Specify: - If Valve: 4. Specify: 4a. Valve type: 4b. Manufactured by: 4c. Year manufactured:	
<b>- If Other Equipment Failure:</b>	
5. Describe: _____	
<b>G7 - Incorrect Operation</b> - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	

<b>Incorrect Operation Sub-Cause:</b>	
- If Other Incorrect Operation:	
1. Describe:	
Complete the following if any Incorrect Operation sub-cause is selected.	
2. Was this Incident related to: (select all that apply)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Inadequate procedure</li> <li>- No procedure established</li> <li>- Failure to follow procedure</li> <li>- Other</li> </ul>	
- If Other, Describe:	
3. What category type was the activity that caused the Incident:	
4. Was the task(s) that led to the Incident identified as a covered task in your Operator Qualification Program?	
4a. If Yes, were the individuals performing the task(s) qualified for the task(s)?	
<b>G8 - Other Incident Cause</b> - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column	
<b>Other Incident Cause – Sub-Cause:</b>	
- If Miscellaneous:	
1. Describe:	
- If Unknown:	
2. Specify:	
<b>PART H - NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT</b>	
<p>On the morning of April 10, 2019, a third-party telecommunications contractor, while in the process of boring in new facilities via horizontal directional drilling along N Duke Street in Durham NC, damaged below-ground piping in PSNC's natural gas system. The contractor notified NC-811, the state's one-call office, of the damage at approximately 9:31 am. NC 811 in turn automatically generated a damage ticket which was delivered to PSNC at approximately 9:35 am. An order was then automatically dispatched to PSNC's first responder at approximately 9:36 am. The first responder reviewed the ticket at approximately 9:43 am and began heading to the site. PSNC received a call from 911 at approximately 9:48 am noting that the fire department was already on the scene. PSNC's Dispatch contacted the first responder in route to advise him of a gas odor and a damaged line at 115 N Duke Street. The fire department issued a combination of evacuation and shelter in place orders at approximately 9:58 am. PSNC's first responder arrived at approx. 10:03 am. Between his arrival and approximately 10:06 am, the PSNC first responder as well as PSNC's Dispatch contacted additional resources to assist with securing and making the scene safe. At approximately 10:06 am, the structure at 115 N Duke Street exploded. Between 10:26am and 10:50 am, additional PSNC employees including a construction crew arrived at the site. Crews convened at the incident command center to evaluate options to shut off the gas flow. At 11:05 am the crews identified the proper valve, secured the necessary tools, and at approximately 11:10 am shut off gas flow to the impacted area by closing a valve located approximately three blocks from the scene. PSNC has since performed a leakage survey over the remaining piping in the vicinity with no leaks or issues found. The section of main approximately 1 block paralleling the bore on Duke Street remains out of service pending the investigation.</p>	
<p>The explosion killed the owner/occupant in the structure that was evacuated. The explosion also severely injured a member of the contractor crew, the PSNC first responder, and a fire fighter. 17 to 25 individuals were reportedly taken to local area hospitals. Six are believed to have been admitted, including PSNC's first responder who died in the hospital, as a result of his injuries, on April 25th.</p>	
<p>The explosion destroyed the structure at 115 N Duke Street and reportedly damaged two others to a point of being condemned until repairs could be completed. Approximately 15 buildings in total were reportedly damaged by the force of the explosion.</p>	
<p>As to PSNC's investigation, it is still ongoing. To date, the investigation has revealed that the service line feeding the structure that exploded was punctured during the directional drilling operation. However, while PSNC has determined that its gas facilities were located by its contract service provider, the investigation has not yet confirmed that the lines either were or were not marked accurately.</p>	
<p>PSNC has had no known issues with the distribution system in this area in the recent past. 15 of 20 impacted customers have been restored.</p>	
<p>As of this report, and until the scene is fully investigated, there remains a number of additional unknowns:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* PSNC has not yet been able to determine the precise time that its gas system was damaged.</li> <li>* PSNC has not been able to determine the ignition source inside of the structure that exploded.</li> <li>* PSNC has not been able to determine the precise number of injuries, again reported in the media to be between 17 and 25 persons.</li> <li>* PSNC still has not developed precise assessments of costs of property damage (operator and public), restoration/repairs that</li> </ul>	

will be required to re-commission the gas system, emergency response costs, the amount of lost gas, etc. Therefore, all figures in this report should be read as estimates until finalized and provided by supplemental reports.

#### PART I - PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Preparer's Name	Michael B. Greene
Preparer's Title	General Manager-Engineering Services
Preparer's Telephone Number	704-217-9191
Preparer's E-mail Address	mgreene@scana.com
Preparer's Facsimile Number	
Authorize Signature's Name	Scott Swindler
Authorized Signature's Title	General Manager-Operations and Maintenance
Authorized Signature's Email Address	mswindler@scana.com



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Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574

April 10, 2019

Appendix 2

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Brian Graves  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2nd, 2019

User: EMS4

**FIRE AND EMS**

04/12/2019 13:19:57

**Event Report**

Event ID: 2019-137193

Call Ref #: 951

Date/Time Received: 04/10/2019 09:11:56

Rept #:	19-09571	Call Source :	W911	Prime Unit :	E1	Service Involved			
							FIRE		
Location: 401 N DUKE ST X-ST: W CORPORATION ST MINERVA AVE Business: DURHAM SCHOOL OF ARTS						DIST: 250.13 ft Jur: CAD Service: FIRE Agency: FEMS St/Beat: 01 District: RA:			
Nature: GAS LEAK OR ODOR						Alarm Lvl: 1	Priority: P	Medical Priority: 60B030	
Caller: AT&T MOBILITY						Alarm:	Call Taker: OSULLIVAN		
Addr: 285 S DUKE ST						Phone: (919) 884-8958	Alarm Type:	Console: CON11N	
Vehicle: St: Report Only: No						Race:	Sex:	Age:	
Geo-Verified Addr: Yes						Nature Summary Code:	Disposition: 1	Close Comments:	
<p>[EFD] Caller Statement: odor of gas ,,, near the beginning of the school outside area.. female passed it and smelled Chief Complaint: Gas leak/odor outside [04/10/19 09:13:02 OSULLIVAN]  [EFD] Dispatch Code: 60B03 (Outside odor (other/unknown source)) Suffix: O (Odor only) Response: . Questions: 1. Not at loc (3rd pty). 2. Prob outside. 3. Gas smelled only. 4. Unk where gas from (odor only). 5. No one sick/inj.</p> <p>Notes: [04/10/19 09:13:26 OSULLIVAN]  ***OPS4*** [04/10/19 09:13:41 MABE]  PER CALLER THE ODOR WAS AT THE INTERSECTION OF DUKE ST AND ONE BLOCK FROM MAIN ST.. AT THE START OF THE SCHOOL [04/10/19 09:16:42 OSULLIVAN]  [EPD] Call Aborted: 7. Changed nature code [04/10/19 09:21:48 OSULLIVAN]</p>									

**Times**

Call Received:	04/10/2019 09:11:56	<u>Time From Call Received</u>	
Call Routed:	04/10/2019 09:13:26	000:01:30	Unit Reaction: 000:03:56 ( <i>1st Dispatch to 1st Arrive</i> )
Call Take Finished:	04/10/2019 09:13:26	000:01:30	En-Route: 000:00:13 ( <i>1st Dispatch to 1st En-Route</i> )
1st Dispatch:	04/10/2019 09:13:36	000:01:40 ( <i>Time Held</i> ):	On-Scene: 000:06:13 ( <i>1st Arrive to Last Clear</i> )
1st En-Route:	04/10/2019 09:13:49	000:01:53	
1st Arrive:	04/10/2019 09:17:32	000:05:36 ( <i>Reaction Time</i> ):	
Last Clear:	04/10/2019 09:23:45	000:11:49	

**Radio Log**

Unit	Empl ID	Type	Description	Time Stamp	Comments	Close Code	User
E1	E1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 09:13:36	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
E1	E1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 09:13:49			Unit:E1
E1	E1	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 09:17:32			Unit:E1
E1	E1	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 09:23:45		1	Unit:E1

Event Log							
Unit	Empl ID	Type	Description	Time Stamp	Comments	Close Code	User
		TR	Time Received	04/10/2019 09:11:56	By: E911		OSULLIVAN
		ENT	Entered Street	04/10/2019 09:11:56	600 W MAIN ST		OSULLIVAN
		CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 09:12:27	285 S DUKE ST --> 401 N DUKE ST		OSULLIVAN
		ENT	Entered Nature	04/10/2019 09:12:28	GUNSHOT WOUND		OSULLIVAN
		LPS	Law Pri. Started	04/10/2019 09:12:28	Case Started		OSULLIVAN
		CHG	Changed Nature	04/10/2019 09:12:31	GUNSHOT WOUND --> GAS LEAK OR ODOR		OSULLIVAN
		FPS	Fire Pri. Started	04/10/2019 09:12:31	Case Started		OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:13:02			OSULLIVAN
		FPF	Fire Pri. CE Finished	04/10/2019 09:13:02	Case Entry Finished		OSULLIVAN
		ENT	Entered Response Category	04/10/2019 09:13:26	ENG		OSULLIVAN
		FIN	Finished Call Taking	04/10/2019 09:13:26			OSULLIVAN
		RPT	Requested Report#	04/10/2019 09:13:26	FEMS Report #19-09571		OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:13:26			OSULLIVAN
		FPD	Fire Pri. Dispatch	04/10/2019 09:13:26	Case Dispatched		OSULLIVAN
		FPC	Fire Pri. Complete	04/10/2019 09:13:34	Case Completed		OSULLIVAN
		RECO	Unit Rec Btn Click	04/10/2019 09:13:35	Unit recommend for GAS LEAK OR ODOR at 401 N DUKE ST (B: DUR)		MABE
		RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 09:13:36	Tone / Rip Run Button Clicked		MABE
		RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 09:13:36	Plan: RSK1 Cat: ENG Lvl: 1		MABE
		RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 09:13:36	Recmnd:E1 [ENG]		MABE
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 09:13:37	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:13:41			MABE
		CHG	Changed CallerName_CallIn	04/10/2019 09:13:46	AT&T MOBILITY --> YOLANDA		OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:16:42			OSULLIVAN
		FPO	Fire Pri. Re-Open	04/10/2019 09:16:50	Case Re-Opened		OSULLIVAN
		CHG	Changed Caller Name	04/10/2019 09:17:03	YOLANDA-->AT&T MOBILITY		OSULLIVAN
		FPC	Fire Pri. Complete	04/10/2019 09:17:04	Case Completed		OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:21:48			OSULLIVAN
		LPA	Law Pri. Aborted	04/10/2019 09:21:48	Case Aborted		OSULLIVAN



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Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574

April 10, 2019

Appendix 3

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Brian Graves  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2nd, 2019

## Event Report

Event ID: 2019-137223

Call Ref #: 37

Date/Time Received: 04/10/2019 09:37:38

Rept #:	19-09574	Call Source :	W911	Prime Unit :	B1	Service Involved			
						LAW	FIRE	EMS	
Location: 115 N DUKE ST X-ST: W MAIN ST W MORGAN ST Business: Phone:									
Nature: STRUCTURE FIRE			Alarm Lvl: 2	Priority: P	Medical Priority: 60C02O				
Caller: DON SMITH				Jur: CAD	Service: FIRE	Agency: FEMS			
Addr: 313 W MAIN ST			Phone: (919) 691-0119	St/Beat: 01	District:	RA:			
Vehicle:	St:	Report Only:	No	Race:	Sex:	Age:			
Geo-Verified Addr: Yes		Nature Summary Code:		Disposition: 1	Close Comments:				
Notes: [EFD] Caller Statement: hit gas line Chief Complaint: Gas leak/odor outside [04/10/19 09:38:26 MITCHELLM] [EFD] Dispatch Code: 60C02 (Outside commercial line) Suffix: O (Odor only) Response: . Questions: 1. At loc (1st pty). 2. Prob outside. 3. Gas smelled only. 4. Gas from: Line. 5. Commercial line. 6. No one sick/inj. [04/10/19 09:38:57 MITCHELLM] ***OPS1*** [04/10/19 09:40:24 MABE] {E1} GET PSNC EN ROUTE [04/10/19 09:47:00 MABE] CALLING GAS [04/10/19 09:48:09 MABE] PSNC NOTIFIED, WILL CALL BACK WITH ETA [04/10/19 09:56:26 MABE] {E1} SEND PD AND FIRE MASHALL [04/10/19 10:01:57 MABE] [LAW] {A500} EMS CODE 3 - MAJOR EXPLOSION [04/10/19 10:07:22 LEACH] PER OTHER CALLER, ,REPORTING THE SAME THING... AN EXPLOSION.. ON THE TOP LEVEL OF THE PARKING GARAGE.. AT FULLER ST.. [04/10/19 10:07:37 OSULLIVAN] [LAW] {A500} all surrounding blocks from Main and Duke shut down completely [04/10/19 10:07:49 LEACH] PER MELLISA SAREN 336.503.2699 [04/10/19 10:07:51 OSULLIVAN] ADDTL CALLER STUART HOWES 9197174713 ADV SAME [04/10/19 10:07:55 BRIDGESK] [LAW] {A500} Close Duke and Chapel Hill, need EMS to Duke/Main for injured firefighter [04/10/19 10:08:08 LEACH] MELISSA IS AT 200 MORRIS ST , 4TH FLOOR AND CAN SEE IT OUT HER WINDOW.... BLACK SMOKE POSS FROM THE TOP FLOOR ON THE GARAGE.. [04/10/19 10:08:38 OSULLIVAN] UNK IF ANY INJURIES FROM THEIR VIEW [04/10/19 10:09:06 OSULLIVAN] ADDTL CALLER CALLING FROM DSA VICTOR 9843899342 ADV HEARD BOOM AND SEES SMOKE [04/10/19 10:09:29 BRIDGESK] [LAW] {A500} EMS CODE 3 TO DUKE AND MAIN [04/10/19 10:09:35 LEACH] {B1} FIREFIGHTER INJ [04/10/19 10:09:48 MABE] {B1} ALL AVAILABLE MEDICS NEEDED ON DUKE ST [04/10/19 10:09:57 MABE] [LAW] CALLING DATA [04/10/19 10:10:19 WHITIST] [EMS] HAVE 4 MEDIC'S ENROUTE AT THIS TIME [04/10/19 10:11:01 WALKERC] [EMS] ADD'TL CALLING 201-906-1217 S GREGSON/MORGAN W/A SUBJ BLEEDING ON THE GROUND....BLEEDING FROM HEAD [04/10/19 10:11:20 WALLO] ADDTL CALLER MARNIE 9196380438 ADV MULTIPLE PEOPLE INJURED [04/10/19 10:11:34 BRIDGESK] [EMS] EMS203 EMS1 EMS211 ENROUTE [04/10/19 10:11:58 WALKERC] CALING ORANGE COUNTY AND WAKE COUNTY 911 FOR EMS COVERAGE.. [04/10/19 10:12:11 OSULLIVAN] ADDTL CALLER 9196686958 ADV HEARD BIG EXPLOSION [04/10/19 10:12:22 BRIDGESK] [LAW] ADDT PT INJURED AT MORGAN/ GREGSON, PT IS BLEEDING FROM THE HEAD.. HIS ARM IS BLOODY.. SPOKE WITH PHILLIP 615.812.1234 [04/10/19 10:12:23 BOBBITC] This is a reopened incident. [04/10/2019 10:13:33 MABE] [LAW] DATA NOTFD OF STREET CLOSINGS [04/10/19 10:13:41 WHITIST] [EMS] MORGAN/DUKE - NEED MEDIC, CRITICAL PT [04/10/19 10:13:47 WALKERC] [EMS] ALL CRITICAL PT AT DUKE/MORGAN 3 PT AT THIS TIME [04/10/19 10:14:08 WALKERC] [EMS] HOSPITALS CONTACTED [04/10/19 10:14:57 WALKERC] CALLING DUKE MEDICAL CENTER FOR PATIENTS RESPONDING [04/10/19 10:15:36 OSULLIVAN] [LAW] REGIONAL NOTFD [04/10/19 10:15:59 WHITIST] CALLING DUKE MEDICAL CENTER IN REGARDS TO 3 PATIENTS IN CRITICAL CONDITION, DUE TO EXPLOSION [04/10/19 10:16:25 OSULLIVAN] [LAW] {POL5} secure pol2 ref perimeter ops [04/10/19 10:16:52 LEACH] {B2} MORGAN/GREGSON [04/10/19 10:17:04 WALKERC] {B2} MORGAN/GREGSON [04/10/19 10:17:04 MABE]									

[LAW] MEDIC TO GREGSON / MORGAN [04/10/19 10:17:14 WHITIST]  
{B1} NEED OXYGEN TO COMMAND SIDE [04/10/19 10:18:16 MABE]  
{B1} AT MORGAN/DUKE [04/10/19 10:18:25 MABE]  
[EMS] {EMS51} MEDICAL TRIAGE AT MORGAN/DUKE [04/10/19 10:19:30 WALKERC]  
{FD8} ASSUMING COMMAND [04/10/19 10:19:39 MABE]  
[EMS] CORRETION,, IT IS 1 PATIENT AND NOT 3 PATIENTS GOING DO TO DMC... [04/10/19 10:20:10 OSULLIVAN]  
[LAW] DUKE NOTIFIED FOR POTENTIAL MASS PATIENTS [04/10/19 10:20:34 OSULLIVAN]  
[EMS] DUKE ER,, ADVISED TO BE READY FOR MULT PATIENTS.. FOR NOW WAS TOLD 1 PATIENT IS IN CRITICAL CONDITION [04/10/19 10:21:04 OSULLIVAN]  
[LAW] {POL2} SIGN SHOP FOR BARRICADES -- MEET AT TRINITY / GREGSON [04/10/19 10:22:48 WHITIST]  
{1SQ} YELLOW TAG AT DUKE/MORGAN [04/10/19 10:23:28 MABE]  
[LAW] SIGN SHOP NOTFD [04/10/19 10:23:52 WHITIST]  
{E4} ON C SIDE CHECKING FOR VICTIMS [04/10/19 10:23:58 MABE]  
[LAW] \*\*\*\*\* OPS4 MEDICAL [04/10/19 10:25:35 WHITIST]  
[EMS] {EMS50} DISPATCH ALL AVAILABLE MEDICS [04/10/19 10:25:49 WALKERC]  
[LAW] PER TRAVIS NOTIFY RALEIGH, CARY AND CHAPEL HILL TO BE NOTIFIED FOR STAND BY [04/10/19 10:26:17 MITCHELLM]  
[LAW] CARY NOTIFIED [04/10/19 10:26:20 MITCHELLM]  
[EMS] MEDICAL BRANCH OPS4 [04/10/19 10:26:38 WALKERC]  
PER ERIC,, REPORTING BLACK SMOKE ALL THE WAY NEAR HOLLOWAY/N HYDE PARK [04/10/19 10:26:58 OSULLIVAN]  
[EMS] {M8} M8 BACK ENROUTE TO DUKE ST [04/10/19 10:27:12 WALKERC]  
{DC100} POLICE COMMAND NEEDED URGENTLY AT MORGAN/N DUKE [04/10/19 10:27:30 ZIMMERMAN]  
[LAW] ORANGE NOTIFIED [04/10/19 10:27:39 MITCHELLM]  
[EMS] HOLD ALL ALPHA RESPONSES [04/10/19 10:27:43 WALKERC]  
[EMS] {M21} BACK ENROUTE TO DUKE ST [04/10/19 10:28:07 WALKERC]  
[LAW] RALEIGH NOTIFIED [04/10/19 10:28:54 MITCHELLM]  
[LAW] A500 IS IC FOR PD ---- SENDING CAR30 TO DUKE/ MORGAN [04/10/19 10:30:16 WHITIST]  
CARY, RALEIGH AND ORANGE NOTIFIED TO BE 10-12 IN CASE NEEDED FOR THIS AND OR OTHER CALLS [04/10/19 10:30:17 MITCHELLM]  
[LAW] {POL5} fire and EMS staging at Duke/Morgan [04/10/19 10:30:20 LEACH]  
[EMS] STG AREA FERNWAY/DUKE COME IN FROM THE EAST SIDE OF DUKE [04/10/19 10:31:11 WALKERC]  
[LAW] {POL5} Official command post is parking lot of old HQ [04/10/19 10:32:16 LEACH]  
[EMS] NORFOLK SOUTHERN RR COMPANY NOTIFIED -MARTY [04/10/19 10:36:23 CARDEN]  
[EMS] EMS STG AT FERNWAY/DUKE [04/10/19 10:36:28 WALKERC]  
[EMS] EMS RADIO TRAFFIC ON OPS4 - EMS51 [04/10/19 10:37:28 WALKERC]  
{L3} ACTIVE FIRE, STARTING TO BREAK THROUGH THE ROOF [04/10/19 10:37:41 MABE]  
{L3} MAY NEED ANOTHER LADDER TRUCK [04/10/19 10:37:52 MABE]  
[EMS] RALEIGH ADVISED 2 MEDICS ARE 10-12 @RDU/BRIERCREEK [04/10/19 10:39:40 WATSON]  
[EMS] RR COMPANY WANTS TO KNOW IF COMMAND WANTS THE TRAINS STOPPED [04/10/19 10:40:45 CARDEN]  
m7 clear Duke [04/10/19 10:41:18 Unit:M7]  
919-607-0355---JOHN AYERS---500 W MORGAN---PNC---WANTS TO KNOW IF STAFF NEEDS TO EVACUATE [04/10/19 10:42:50 MITCHELLM]  
[LAW] EMS TO 604 WEST VILLAGE -- FEM WITH GLASS IN HEAD [04/10/19 10:43:56 WHITIST]  
[EMS] Norfolk Southern Police notified to let the trains continue-Jessica [04/10/19 10:45:34 CARDEN]  
[LAW] {POL5} Per Command, have trains stopped through downtown area [04/10/19 10:46:12 LEACH]  
PNC NOTIFIED, NO NEED TO EVACUATE [04/10/19 10:47:17 MITCHELLM]  
[EMS] Norfolk Southern Police notfied command does want all trains stopped till further advised.Jessica [04/10/19 10:48:07 CARDEN]  
m7 back on scene [04/10/19 10:48:54 Unit:M7]  
[EMS] One train is about to come through Durham and they are trying to get it stopped, but if not all others will be stopped. [04/10/19 10:49:31 CARDEN]  
{E10} C SIDE OF STRUCT [04/10/19 10:50:00 MABE]  
[LAW] {POL5} 701 W Main someone trapped in the elevator, SE wing of the 5th floor [04/10/19 10:51:29 LEACH]  
[LAW] {POL5} PD TO STAGE AT OLD HQ [04/10/19 10:52:17 WHITIST]  
[EMS] HZ TEAM REQ MIRV [04/10/19 10:53:31 WALKERC]  
[LAW] JUSTIN GREENIDGE 9196733238 ADV THAT HIS VEH WAS DAMAGED FROM THE EXPLOSION --- COMP IS AT 8727 MORGAN ST NEAR A BAR CALLED SHOOTERS SALOON --- WHI NISSAN MAXIMA SEDAN [04/10/19 10:56:23 BRIDGESK]  
{L17} FIRE SHOWING THROUGH ROOF ON DUKE ST SIDE [04/10/19 11:00:19 MABE]  
[EMS] OPS8 FOR LOGISTICS [04/10/19 11:06:21 WALKERC]  
[EMS] ALL TRAINS HAVE BEEN STOPPED TILL FURTHER NOTICE AND NORFOLK SOUTHERN REQUESTING A CALL BACK WHEN TRAINS CAN COME THROUGH [04/10/19 11:08:15 CARDEN]  
[LAW] HAVE A500 CALL FEMALE THAT NEEDS TO GET TO HER DAUGHTER NUMBER IS 732-429-3680 [04/10/19 11:09:18 BLACKMANL]  
{E4} OUT OF BLDG, GOING TO REHAB [04/10/19 11:22:05 MABE]  
{7SQ} NEED RELIEF ON 2.5" LINE [04/10/19 11:22:43 MABE]

{L3} L3A L3C GOING TO REHAB [04/10/19 11:26:43 MABE]  
{Q7} GOING TO REHAB [04/10/19 11:26:47 MABE]  
{7SQ} REHAB [04/10/19 11:26:52 MABE]  
{EMS} REHAB [04/10/19 11:27:14 MABE]  
{L6} REHAB [04/10/19 11:27:38 MABE]  
{FD8} NO FURTHER PAR CHECK NOTIFICATIONS FROM COMMUNICATIONS [04/10/19 11:34:59 MABE]  
[EMS] M, M22 M8 EMS50 EMS51 EMS52 [04/10/19 11:41:11 WALKERC]  
NICOLE SMITH W/PSNC REQ COMANND TO 10-21 HER @ 803-217-9501 [04/10/19 11:43:05 WALLO]  
[LAW] MALE NAMED JUSTIN THAT HAS DAMAGE TO HIS VEH DUE TO EXPLOSION NO LONGER 10-12...WILL CB WHEN HE RETURNS TO DURHAM [04/10/19 11:47:01 WALLO]  
{FD31} CLEAR OPS7, GOING BACK TO OPS1 FOR NOW [04/10/19 11:48:08 MABE]  
{FD20} B4 WILL NOW BE HAZMAT COMMAND [04/10/19 11:50:21 MABE]  
[EMS] M7 M22 M8 EMS50 EMS51 EMS52 EMS 202 203 211 MD1 CP2 EMS 50 EMS51 EMS 52 M8 M7 M22 [04/10/19 11:50:47 WALKERC]  
{L17} GOING TO REHAB [04/10/19 11:51:25 MABE]  
WAKE EMS34 MOVING INTO CITY FROM THE RDU AREA [04/10/19 11:53:59 MITCHELLM]  
[LAW] ED51 REQ PATCH OPS13 TO POL2 [04/10/19 11:58:09 WHITIST]  
SHERRI CURRY 336 202 0353 SPECIAL AGENT WITH NORFOLK SOUTHERN RR.....REQ PHONE CALL WHEN THEY CAN RESUME TRAINS....ALSO ADVISED THAT HER BOSSSES ARE MAKING HER CALL EVERY HOUR ANYWAY TO SEE WHEN THEY CAN RESUME [04/10/19 12:01:08 BROWNS]  
{FD20} HEAVY SMOKE FROM TOREROS [04/10/19 12:03:52 MABE]  
{FD20} 41% AT DUKE/MAIN, DOESN'T SEEM TO BE MIGRATING [04/10/19 12:10:09 MABE]  
[EMS] {MIRV1} ON SCENE FOR OVER AN HOUR [04/10/19 12:21:42 OSULLIVAN]  
[EMS] {EMS51} HAVE A COMPLETE PAR [04/10/19 12:22:22 OSULLIVAN]  
[LAW] REQ FORENSICS -- BEST ACCESS FROM DUKE / TRINITY [04/10/19 13:15:06 WHITIST]  
[LAW] FORENSICS TO COMMAND POST DUKE/ MORGAN [04/10/19 13:15:43 WHITIST]  
[LAW] SWITCH TO POL5 WHEN 10-17 [04/10/19 13:15:59 WHITIST]  
[LAW] {POL5} 801 ADV GREY JEEP CHEROKEE COMING IN DUKE/ CHAPEL HILL [04/10/19 13:40:22 WHITIST]  
[LAW] {ED2} DOT SIGN ON 147 TO SAY DUKE ST IS CLOSED [04/10/19 15:10:41 WHITIST]  
[LAW] E AND W CHAPEL HILL HAS BEEN REOPENED EXCEPT AT DUKE ST [04/10/19 15:11:28 WHITIST]  
PER FD38 ACTIVE FIRE INSIDE PORSCHE DEALERSHIP [04/10/19 15:26:01 MABE]  
[LAW] {DOT} NOTFD OF SIGNAGE REQ FOR 147 [04/10/19 15:27:21 WHITIST]  
[LAW] {CAR30} QUALITY MORTUARY REQUESTED [04/10/19 16:43:33 CARDEN]  
[LAW] QUAILITY NEEDED AT GREGSON / MORGAN [04/10/19 16:44:36 CARDEN]  
[LAW] Martha Regalio adv that her building was supposed to be evacuated at West Village on Morgan St but they were never notified, she wants to know if she leaves this location will she be able to get back to her home later. 10-21 compl 919 475 0433 [04/10/19 16:45:17 ALLENJ]  
[LAW] QUALITY MORTUARY NOTIFIED AND WILL BE 10-17 NOW [04/10/19 16:46:05 CARDEN]  
[LAW] Michelle Terry lives in West Village and would like to speak with PD in ref to getting her items and when she could come back ---work number 919 530 6795, cell number --- 919 638 0994. [04/10/19 17:31:12 ALLENJ]  
Dannie Roberts, Owner of Shooters adv that he will not be opening due to the incident and if space is needed to park, units are welcomed to use the Parking Lot. 10-21 Compl at 919 369 8381 [04/10/19 17:40:48 ALLENJ]  
Julie Noria adv that her boyfriend works construction in the area and she cant get ahold of him, wants to speak with PD to get more information 10-21 compl at 646 660 4439 [04/10/19 17:45:25 ALLENJ]  
[LAW] {POL5} next on rot to heavily damaged SUV, have them respond to Gregson/Morgan [04/10/19 17:47:14 LEACH]  
[LAW] {TOW} ROBERTS 10-17 [04/10/19 17:51:30 BLACKMANL]  
FIRE TO KNOCK DOWN ON THE CHARLIE SIDE [04/10/19 17:53:54 MITCHELLM]  
[LAW] {D15} NEED QUALITY TO RESPOND BACK OUT [04/10/19 17:55:03 BLACKMANL]  
[LAW] {POL5} req ID back to N Duke/Morgan [04/10/19 18:03:00 LEACH]  
[LAW] {POL5} Need a tow for the Carolina Livery - 20 passenger bus needs to be towed from scene [04/10/19 18:03:47 LEACH]  
[LAW] {POL5} Tow truck driver on scene adv the bus will not be a heavy tow - command running veh tag to confirm the weight. [04/10/19 18:19:01 LEACH]  
[LAW] {POL5} 10-22 Carolina Livery tow req for now [04/10/19 18:20:10 LEACH]  
[LAW] {POL5} Owner req for Lemons for 20-25 passenger van, Carolina Livery [04/10/19 18:22:18 LEACH]  
[LAW] \*\*\*OR LEMONS WRECKER 10-17 FOR OWNERS REQ [04/10/19 18:33:09 BALLENTINE]  
[LAW] {CAR30} transferring command to BK50, clear police 2 and ops13 [04/10/19 19:28:20 LEACH]  
[LAW] Harriet Puttman is the Director of Duke memorial Preschool and would like to speak with PD in ref to openings tomorrow. 10-21 compl at 919 423 3713 [04/10/19 21:06:06 ALLENJ]  
[EMS] MRS. JULIE NORA ADVISED HER BF WAS WORKING IN DOWNTOWN DURHAM TODAY AND SHE HAS NOT HEARD FROM HIM SINCE THE FIRE. SUBJS NAME IS PETER GEORGESON. WOULD LIKE 10-21 FROM PD WITH ANY INFO IF ANY AVAILABLE AT ALL. 10-21 CALLER AT 646-660-4439 [04/10/19 22:36:59 FRANCO]  
[LAW] BK50 XFERRING COMMAND TO G1 [04/11/19 00:14:55 BALLENTINE]  
[LAW] 1013 W Main St. brown and white ford econoline van blocking the roadway fire truck on scene can't pass. Driver is a bm in late 60's taking pics of the scene still in the area [04/11/19 00:19:44 HANDWORK]  
[EMS] STOC/DOT REQ LIST OF ROADS THAT ARE STILL GOING TO BE CLOSED [04/11/19 00:58:45 PRICES]  
[LAW] NOTIFIED STOC OF CONTINUED ROAD CLOSURE.....ADV THEY WILL CB MAYBE ONCE A SHIFT TO GET UPDATE ON ROAD CLOSURES [04/11/19 01:30:39 PRICES]

[LAW] G1 TRNSF COMMAND TO BK30 [04/11/19 06:05:06 KENDALME]  
 [EMS] HAZMAT UNITS NOW ON OPS10----- [04/11/19 08:15:01 WORRELLSW]  
 [EMS] FIRE OPERATIONS ON OPS9----- [04/11/19 08:15:16 WORRELLSW]  
 [EMS] EMS OPERATIONS ON OPS14----- [04/11/19 08:15:24 WORRELLSW]  
 [LAW] {D223} NEED A UNIT NEAR FULLER/MORGAN TO GIVE A RESIDENT AT 206 N DUKE ST APT 226 AN  
 ESCORT TO GET A DOG [04/11/19 09:10:49 BLACKMANL]  
 [LAW] {D223} 10-22 LAST [04/11/19 09:12:23 BLACKMANL]  
 [EMS] EM5 ADV LINES NEED TO BE REMOVED AT DUKE/MORGAN [04/11/19 09:35:43 CAPPSCA]  
 [EMS] CONTACTING DUKE [04/11/19 09:35:56 CAPPSCA]  
 [EMS] DUKE TICKET NUMBER D11002432 [04/11/19 09:42:42 CAPPSCA]  
 801 relieving 223 at MORGAN ST/ FULLER ST [04/11/19 09:43:48 Unit:801]  
 [LAW] DUKE ENERGY SHOULD BE ON SCENE IN 15 [04/11/19 09:46:30 KENDALME]  
 [EMS] {MIRV1} NO 10-90 CHECKS NEEDED, WILL BE ON OPS14 [04/11/19 13:08:03 MABE]  
 [LAW] PD req Street maintence ref to glass clean up at Main/DUKE [04/11/19 21:26:45 ALLENJ]  
 [LAW] {STM} Spoke to after hours street maintenance, he adv they have scheduled third shift street sweepers to come through  
 and will contact someone to see if they can come out sooner. No further [04/11/19 21:33:48 HANDWORK]  
 [LAW] Cpt Montgomery back online- req STM call her for update on eta. Receiving a lot of pressure t re-open street. [04/11/19  
 22:06:09 MILLERJ]  
 [LAW] Street Maintenance notified to 10-21 Captain Montgomery [04/11/19 22:09:51 HANDWORK]

### Times

Call Received: 04/10/2019 09:37:38	<u>Time From Call Received</u>	Unit Reaction: 000:04:32 ( <i>1st Dispatch to 1st Arrive</i> )
Call Routed: 04/10/2019 09:38:56	000:01:18	En-Route: 000:00:45 ( <i>1st Dispatch to 1st En-Route</i> )
Call Take Finished: 04/10/2019 09:38:56	000:01:18	On-Scene: 012:25:06 ( <i>1st Arrive to Last Clear</i> )
1st Dispatch: 04/10/2019 09:40:17	000:02:39 ( <i>Time Held</i> ):	
1st En-Route: 04/10/2019 09:41:02	000:03:24	
1st Arrive: 04/10/2019 09:44:49	000:07:11 ( <i>Reaction Time</i> ):	
Last Clear: 04/11/2019 22:09:55	012:32:17	

Radio Log							
Unit	Empl ID	Type	Description	Time Stamp	Comments	Close Code	User
E1	E1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 09:40:17	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
L3		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 09:40:17	Stat/Beat: 03		MABE
E1	E1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 09:41:02			MABE
L3		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 09:42:01			Unit:L3
E1	E1	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 09:44:49			Unit:E1
L3		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 09:48:08		16	Unit:L3
L3		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 09:57:49	Stat/Beat: 03		MABE
L3		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 09:57:49	Stat/Beat: 03		MABE
B1	B1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:04:25	Stat/Beat: 111		Unit:B1
B1	B1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:04:25	Stat/Beat: 111		Unit:B1
L3		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:04:57			Unit:L3
FD8	FD8	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 888		MABE
ISQ		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 51		MABE
E2	E2	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 02		MABE
E5	E5	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 05		MABE
E4	E4	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 04		MABE
E10	E10	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 10		MABE
Q11	Q11	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 11		MABE
L12		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 12		MABE
L17		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 17		MABE
B2	B2	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 222		MABE
B4		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Stat/Beat: 444		MABE
B2	B2	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:07:15			Unit:B2
E2	E2	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:07:15			Unit:E2
E5	E5	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:07:40			Unit:E5
E10	E10	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:07:48			Unit:E10
L12		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:07:54			Unit:L12
MS1	MS1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:07:57	Stat/Beat: MS1		MABE
E6	E6	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:07:57	Stat/Beat: 06		MABE
E12	E12	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:07:58	Stat/Beat: 12		MABE
EM5		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:08:07	Stat/Beat: EM		MABE
EM5		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:08:07	Stat/Beat: EM		MABE
FD8	FD8	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:08:11			MABE
HM13	HM13	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:08:17	Stat/Beat: 13;E		MABE
HM13	HM13	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:08:17	Stat/Beat: 13;E		MABE
Q11	Q11	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:08:54			Unit:Q11
E4	E4	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:08:54			Unit:E4
E12	E12	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:09:23			MABE
B4		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:09:47			Unit:B4
E6	E6	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:10:21			Unit:E6
E6	E6	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:10:41	Cancelled by Exchange Command		MABE
E3	E3	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:10:41	Out Srv: [20] at		MABE
E3	E3	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:10:41	Out Srv: [20] at		MABE
FD2		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:10:43	Stat/Beat: FD20		IANNUZZICH
FD2		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:10:43	Stat/Beat: FD20		IANNUZZICH
MS1	MS1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:10:51			Unit:MS1
E2	E2	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:11:11			Unit:E2
4SQ		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:11:28	Stat/Beat: 54		Unit:4SQ
4SQ		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:11:28	Stat/Beat: 54		Unit:4SQ
E5	E5	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:11:50			Unit:E5
L6	L6	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:11:54	Stat/Beat: 06		Unit:L6
L6	L6	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:11:54	Stat/Beat: 06		Unit:L6
FD2		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled		MABE
MS1	MS1	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled		MABE

HM13	HM13	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
1SQ		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E1	E1	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E10	E10	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
Q11	Q11	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E12	E12	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
L12		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
4SQ		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E4	E4	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
B1	B1	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E5	E5	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
L6	L6	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
B4		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
L17		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
FD8	FD8	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
B2	B2	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
L3		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E3	E3	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
E2	E2	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
EM5		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:13:04	Event Cancelled	MABE
B1	B1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:13:45	Stat/Beat: 111	MABE
B1	B1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:13:45	Stat/Beat: 111	MABE
B1	B1	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:13:45	Stat/Beat: 111	MABE
B2	B2	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:13:55	Stat/Beat: 222	MABE
B2	B2	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:13:55	Stat/Beat: 222	MABE
B2	B2	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:13:55	Stat/Beat: 222	MABE
L3		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 03	MABE
L3		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 03	MABE
L3		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 03	MABE
E2	E2	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 02	MABE
E2	E2	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 02	MABE
E2	E2	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 02	MABE
ISQ		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 51	MABE
ISQ		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 51	MABE
ISQ		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:14:05	Stat/Beat: 51	MABE
E5	E5	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Stat/Beat: 05	MABE
E5	E5	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Stat/Beat: 05	MABE
E5	E5	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Stat/Beat: 05	MABE
E1	E1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Stat/Beat: 01	MABE
E1	E1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Stat/Beat: 01	MABE
E1	E1	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Stat/Beat: 01	MABE
HM13	HM13	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:32	Stat/Beat: 13	MABE
HM13	HM13	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:32	Stat/Beat: 13	MABE
E3	E3	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:14:32	Stat/Beat: 03	MABE
E3	E3	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:14:32	Stat/Beat: 03	MABE
EM5		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:15:07	Stat/Beat: EM	MABE
EM5		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:15:07	Stat/Beat: EM	MABE
EM5		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:15:09		MABE
E4	E4	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:15:18	Stat/Beat: 04	MABE
E4	E4	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:15:18	Stat/Beat: 04	MABE
E16	E16	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:15:44	Out Srv: [5] at	BLACKMANL
E16	E16	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:15:44	Out Srv: [5] at	BLACKMANL
E16	E16	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:15:44	Out Srv: [5] at	BLACKMANL
B4		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:15:44	Stat/Beat: 444	MABE
B4		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:15:44	Stat/Beat: 444	MABE
4SQ		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:20	Stat/Beat: 54	MABE

4SQ		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:20	Stat/Beat: 54		MABE
E4	E4	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:16:24			Unit:E4
E9	E9	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:25	Stat/Beat: 09		MABE
E9	E9	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:25	Stat/Beat: 09		MABE
E10	E10	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:28	Stat/Beat: 10		MABE
E10	E10	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:28	Stat/Beat: 10		MABE
B3	B3	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:37	Out Srv: [20] at		MABE
B3	B3	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:37	Out Srv: [20] at		MABE
L2	L2	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:42	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
L2	L2	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:42	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
Q11	Q11	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:52	Stat/Beat: 11		MABE
Q11	Q11	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:52	Stat/Beat: 11		MABE
Q11	Q11	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:16:52	Stat/Beat: 11		MABE
L12		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:16:54	Stat/Beat: 12		MABE
L12		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:16:54	Stat/Beat: 12		MABE
L12		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:16:54	Stat/Beat: 12		MABE
Q7		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:17:33	Stat/Beat: 07		MABE
Q7		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:17:33	Stat/Beat: 07		MABE
Q7		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:17:38			Unit:Q7
MS1	MS1	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:18:01	Stat/Beat: MS1		MABE
MS1	MS1	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:18:01	Stat/Beat: MS1		MABE
SAF1		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:18:01	Out Srv: [O] at		MABE
SAF1		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:18:01	Out Srv: [O] at		MABE
7SQ		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:18:57	Stat/Beat: 57		Unit:7SQ
7SQ		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:18:57	Stat/Beat: 57		Unit:7SQ
7SQ		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:19:28			Unit:7SQ
FD8	FD8	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:19:34	Stat/Beat: 888		MABE
FD8	FD8	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:19:34	Stat/Beat: 888		MABE
FD8	FD8	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:19:34	Stat/Beat: 888		MABE
B3	B3	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 10:20:02		16	Unit:B3
B3	B3	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:20:20	Stat/Beat: 333		MABE
B3	B3	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:20:20	Stat/Beat: 333		MABE
B3	B3	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:20:20	Stat/Beat: 333		MABE
FD20	FD20	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:20:43	Stat/Beat: FD20		MABE
FD20	FD20	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:20:43	Stat/Beat: FD20		MABE
FD20	FD20	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:21:01			Unit:FD20
E3	E3	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:09			MABE
L2	L2	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:12			MABE
MS1	MS1	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:13			MABE
B4		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:15			MABE
4SQ		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:16			MABE
E10	E10	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:39			MABE
E9	E9	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:41			MABE
HM13	HM13	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:23:43			MABE
EM2		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:26:45	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM2		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:26:45	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM2		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:26:45	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM3		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:26:45	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM3		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:26:45	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM3		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:26:45	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM2		X	Canceled	04/10/2019 10:26:57			WHITIST
EM4		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:27:00	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM4		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:27:00	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
EM4		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:27:00	Stat/Beat: EM		WHITIST
DC100		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:27:27	Out Srv: [O] at		ZIMMERMAN
DC100		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:27:27	Out Srv: [O] at		ZIMMERMAN

DC100		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:27:27	Out Srv: [O] at		ZIMMERMAN
FD31		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:34:26			MABE
FD31		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:34:26			MABE
FD31		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:34:26			MABE
FD6	FD6	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:34:26	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
FD6	FD6	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:34:26	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
FD6	FD6	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:34:26	Stat/Beat: 01		MABE
L17		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:39:20	Stat/Beat: 17		MABE
L17		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:39:20	Stat/Beat: 17		MABE
L17		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 10:39:28			MABE
E13	E13	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 10:52:01	Stat/Beat: 13		MABE
E13	E13	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 10:55:04			Unit:E13
E13	E13	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 11:02:47			Unit:E13
FD36		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 11:08:43			MABE
FD36		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 11:08:43			MABE
FD36		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 11:08:43			MABE
SAF1		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 11:26:14			MABE
L6	L6	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 11:27:35	Stat/Beat: 06		MABE
L6	L6	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 11:27:35	Stat/Beat: 06		MABE
L6	L6	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 11:27:35	Stat/Beat: 06		MABE
E3	E3	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 13:49:20		16	Unit:E3
L6	L6	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 13:53:56		16	Unit:L6
L12		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:08:50		16	Unit:L12
Q11	Q11	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:19:21		16	Unit:Q11
B2	B2	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:23:27		16	Unit:B2
E16	E16	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:33:52		16	MABE
7SQ		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:36:10		16	MABE
L2	L2	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:40:13		16	Unit:L2
1SQ		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:46:44		16	Unit:1SQ
E10	E10	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 14:55:09		16	Unit:E10
L17		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 15:24:09		16	MABE
TANK17		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 15:46:35	Stat/Beat: 17		MABE
TANK17		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 15:46:35	Stat/Beat: 17		MABE
E2	E2	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 15:57:14		10	Unit:E2
E5	E5	L	Location Change	04/10/2019 15:57:40	FIRE STATION 5		Unit:E5
HM13	HM13	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 16:02:59		16	Unit:HM13
TANK17		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 16:06:58			MABE
E13	E13	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 16:08:25		16	Unit:E13
B4		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 16:29:52		16	MABE
B1	B1	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 16:43:19		10	Unit:B1
E5	E5	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 17:22:06		16	Unit:E5
EM5		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 19:09:31		16	MABE
EM5		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 19:15:06	Stat/Beat: EM		MABE
EM5		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 19:15:06	Stat/Beat: EM		MABE
EM5		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 19:15:06	Stat/Beat: EM		MABE
E18		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 19:31:56	Out Srv: [O] at		MABE
E18		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 19:31:56	Out Srv: [O] at		MABE
E18		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 19:32:03			MABE
TANK17		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 19:52:35		16	MABE
E4	E4	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 19:58:02		16	Unit:E4
E1	E1	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:04:10		16	PRICES
4SQ		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:09:37		16	Unit:4SQ
FD31		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:16:43	16		PRICES
FD6	FD6	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:16:43	16		PRICES
DC100		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:23:58	16		PRICES
E9	E9	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:29:41		16	Unit:E9

FD8	FD8	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:37:05		16	FD8
Q7		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:39:40		16	Unit:Q7
EM3		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:47:01		16	NICOLAYSEN
EM4		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:47:01		16	NICOLAYSEN
EM5		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 20:47:01		16	NICOLAYSEN
L3		L	Location Change	04/10/2019 20:53:43	STATION 1		Unit:L3
FD20	FD20	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 21:07:51		16	Unit:FD20
MS1	MS1	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 21:14:52		16	Unit:MS1
TANK18		D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 21:22:19	Stat/Beat: 18		PRICES
TANK18		E	En-Route	04/10/2019 21:22:19	Stat/Beat: 18		PRICES
TANK18		A	Arrived	04/10/2019 21:22:19	Stat/Beat: 18		PRICES
E19	E19	D	Dispatched	04/10/2019 21:35:37	Stat/Beat: 19		Unit:E19
E19	E19	E	En-Route	04/10/2019 21:35:37	Stat/Beat: 19		Unit:E19
E19	E19	A	Arrived	04/10/2019 21:45:48			Unit:E19
SAF1		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 21:46:34		16	Unit:SAF1
L3		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 21:59:43		16	Unit:L3
B3	B3	X	Canceled	04/10/2019 22:16:09	Pre-empted to Event # 840		WORRELLSW
E18		C	Cleared	04/10/2019 22:29:04		16	Unit:E18
E19	E19	C	Cleared	04/10/2019 23:54:52		16	Unit:E19
TANK11		D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 00:26:24	Stat/Beat: 11		WORRELLSW
TANK11		E	En-Route	04/11/2019 00:26:24	Stat/Beat: 11		WORRELLSW
TANK11		A	Arrived	04/11/2019 00:26:24	Stat/Beat: 11		WORRELLSW
B4		D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 00:44:01	Stat/Beat: 444		Unit:B4
B4		E	En-Route	04/11/2019 00:44:01	Stat/Beat: 444		Unit:B4
B4		A	Arrived	04/11/2019 00:44:01	Stat/Beat: 444		Unit:B4
TANK18		C	Cleared	04/11/2019 01:05:40		16	WORRELLSW
E8	E8	D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 01:55:28	Out Srv: [O] at HEADED TO 115 N DUKE ST		WORRELLSW
E8	E8	E	En-Route	04/11/2019 01:55:28	Out Srv: [O] at HEADED TO 115 N DUKE ST		WORRELLSW
E8	E8	A	Arrived	04/11/2019 01:55:28	Out Srv: [O] at HEADED TO 115 N DUKE ST		WORRELLSW
TANK19	TANK19	D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 03:23:53	Stat/Beat: 19		WORRELLSW
TANK19	TANK19	E	En-Route	04/11/2019 03:23:53	Stat/Beat: 19		WORRELLSW
TANK19	TANK19	A	Arrived	04/11/2019 03:23:53	Stat/Beat: 19		WORRELLSW
FD38		D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 03:27:25			WORRELLSW
FD38		E	En-Route	04/11/2019 03:27:25			WORRELLSW
FD38		X	Canceled	04/11/2019 03:27:34	Pre-empted to Event # 59		WORRELLSW
TANK11		C	Cleared	04/11/2019 03:43:49		16	WORRELLSW
E12	E12	D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 03:44:34	Stat/Beat: 12		WORRELLSW
E12	E12	E	En-Route	04/11/2019 03:44:34	Stat/Beat: 12		WORRELLSW
E12	E12	A	Arrived	04/11/2019 03:44:34	Stat/Beat: 12		WORRELLSW
B4		C	Cleared	04/11/2019 03:48:49		16	Unit:B4
E17	E17	D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 03:57:05	Out Srv: [O] at		WORRELLSW
E17	E17	E	En-Route	04/11/2019 03:57:05	Out Srv: [O] at		WORRELLSW
E17	E17	A	Arrived	04/11/2019 03:57:05	Out Srv: [O] at		WORRELLSW
E8	E8	C	Cleared	04/11/2019 04:26:00		16	Unit:E8
TANK19	TANK19	C	Cleared	04/11/2019 06:18:28		16	PRICES
SAF1		D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 06:56:04	Stat/Beat: SAF1		Unit:SAF1
SAF1		E	En-Route	04/11/2019 06:56:04	Stat/Beat: SAF1		Unit:SAF1
SAF1		A	Arrived	04/11/2019 06:56:04	Stat/Beat: SAF1		Unit:SAF1
E17	E17	C	Cleared	04/11/2019 07:13:38		16	WORRELLSW
SAF1		C	Cleared	04/11/2019 07:38:42		16	Unit:SAF1
E12	E12	C	Cleared	04/11/2019 07:49:29		16	WORRELLSW
E1	E1	D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 08:04:45	Out Evt: [D] at 2920 SPRUCEWOOD DR		WORRELLSW
E1	E1	E	En-Route	04/11/2019 08:04:45	Out Evt: [D] at 2920 SPRUCEWOOD DR		WORRELLSW
E1	E1	A	Arrived	04/11/2019 08:04:45	Out Evt: [D] at 2920 SPRUCEWOOD DR		WORRELLSW
EM5		D	Dispatched	04/11/2019 12:49:00	Stat/Beat: EM		CAPPSA
EM5		E	En-Route	04/11/2019 12:49:00	Stat/Beat: EM		CAPPSA

EM5		A	Arrived	04/11/2019 12:49:00	Stat/Beat: EM		CAPPSA
EM5		C	Cleared	04/11/2019 16:57:10		16	CARDEN
E1	E1	C	Cleared	04/11/2019 17:08:09		16	Unit:E1
FD36		C	Cleared	04/11/2019 22:09:55		1	PRICES

Event Log							
Unit	Empl ID	Type	Description	Time Stamp	Comments	Close Code	User
		TR	Time Received	04/10/2019 09:37:38	By: E911		MITCHELLM
		ENT	Entered Street	04/10/2019 09:37:38	301 W MAIN ST		MITCHELLM
		DLS	Duplicate List	04/10/2019 09:37:47	Potential Duplicate Events Listed (1		MITCHELLM
		CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 09:38:01	313 W MAIN ST --> N DUKE ST/W MAIN ST		MITCHELLM
		DLS	Duplicate List	04/10/2019 09:38:10	Potential Duplicate Events Listed (1		MITCHELLM
		CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 09:38:12	N DUKE ST/W MAIN ST --> 115 N DUKE ST		MITCHELLM
		ENT	Entered Nature	04/10/2019 09:38:16	GAS LEAK OR ODOR		MITCHELLM
		FPS	Fire Pri. Started	04/10/2019 09:38:16	Case Started		MITCHELLM
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:38:26			MITCHELLM
		FPP	Fire Pri. CE Finished	04/10/2019 09:38:26	Case Entry Finished		MITCHELLM
		ENT	Entered Response Category	04/10/2019 09:38:56	EL		MITCHELLM
		RPT	Requested Report#	04/10/2019 09:38:56	FEMS Report #19-09574		MITCHELLM
		FIN	Finished Call Taking	04/10/2019 09:38:56			MITCHELLM
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:38:57			MITCHELLM
		FPD	Fire Pri. Dispatch	04/10/2019 09:38:57	Case Dispatched		MITCHELLM
		FPC	Fire Pri. Complete	04/10/2019 09:39:24	Case Completed		MITCHELLM
		FPO	Fire Pri. Re-Open	04/10/2019 09:39:29	Case Re-Opened		MITCHELLM
		RECO	Unit Rec Btn Click	04/10/2019 09:40:16	Unit recommend for GAS LEAK OR ODOR at 115 N DUKE ST (Caller		MABE
		RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 09:40:17	Tone / Rip Run Button Clicked		MABE
		RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 09:40:17	Recmnd:E1 [ENG], L3 [LAD]		MABE
		RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 09:40:17	Plan: RSK1 Cat: EL Lvl: 1		MABE
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 09:40:18	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		CHG	Changed Caller Name	04/10/2019 09:40:20	VERIZON-->DON SMITH		MITCHELLM
		FPC	Fire Pri. Complete	04/10/2019 09:40:20	Case Completed		MITCHELLM
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:40:24			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:47:00			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:48:09			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 09:56:26			MABE
		FF			LAW		MABE

		Fast Forward to LAW	04/10/2019 10:01:35		
	SP	Spawned	04/10/2019 10:01:41	Spawned LAW event #2019137256, callref #16	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:01:57		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:01:57	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:06:44	Units: E1,B1,L3	MABE
	CHG	Changed Nature	04/10/2019 10:06:45	GAS LEAK OR ODOR --> STRUCTURE FIRE	MABE
	FPS	Fire Pri. Started	04/10/2019 10:06:45	Case Started	MABE
	RECO	Unit Rec Btn Click	04/10/2019 10:06:48	Unit recommend for STRUCTURE FIRE at 115 N DUKE ST (Caller:	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:06:49	Tone / Rip Run Button Clicked	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Plan: RSK1 Cat: SF3 Lvl: 1	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Recmnd:E4 [ENG], E10 [ENG], Q11 [LAD]	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Recmnd:FD8, ISQ [SQ], E2 [ENG], E5 [ENG]	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Recmnd:B4 [BAT]	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Recmnd:L12 [LAD], L17 [LAD], B2 [BAT]	MABE
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:06:50	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	SP	Spawned	04/10/2019 10:06:53	Spawned EMS event #2019137262, callref #22	WALKERC
	SP	Spawned	04/10/2019 10:06:53	Spawned EMS event #2019137263, callref #23	MABE
	FF	Fast Forward to EMS	04/10/2019 10:06:53	EMS	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:22	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:37		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:37	Sent to: Linked Events	OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:49	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:51		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:51	Sent to: Linked Events	OSULLIVAN
	FPC	Fire Pri. Complete	04/10/2019 10:07:52	Case Completed	MABE
	RECO	Unit Rec Btn Click	04/10/2019 10:07:54	Unit recommend for STRUCTURE FIRE at 115 N DUKE ST (Caller:	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:55		BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:07:55	Sent to: Linked Events	BRIDGESK
	CHG	Changed Alarm Level	04/10/2019 10:07:57	1 --> 2	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:07:57	Tone / Rip Run Button Clicked	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:07:57	Plan: RSK1 Cat: SF3 Lvl: 2	MABE

	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:07:57	Recmnd:MS1, E6 [ENG], E12 [ENG]		MABE
	CHG	Changed Alarmlev	04/10/2019 10:07:57	1 ---> 2		MABE
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:07:58	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:08:08	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		LEACH
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:08:08	Paged EM		PAGESRV
	CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 10:08:13	115 N DUKE ST --> 115 N DUKE ST		BOBBITTC
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:08:18	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:08:38			OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:08:38	Sent to: Linked Events		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:06			OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:06	Sent to: Linked Events		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:29			BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:30	Sent to: Linked Events		BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:35	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:48			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:48	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:57			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:09:57	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:10:19	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:10:42	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:11:01	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:11:20	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALLO
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:11:34			BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:11:34	Sent to: Linked Events		BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:11:58	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:12:11			OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:12:11	Sent to: Linked Events		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:12:22			BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:12:22	Sent to: Linked Events		BRIDGESK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:12:23	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		BOBBITTC
	CAN	Event Cancelled	04/10/2019 10:13:07		ACC	MABE

		ROPN	Re-Opened Event	04/10/2019 10:13:33	ERROR		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:13:41	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:13:46	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:13:47	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:13:56	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:14:06	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:14:08	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:14:18	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:14:33	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:14:57	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:15:08	Paged EM		PAGESRV
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:15:19	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:15:36			OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:15:36	Sent to: Linked Events		OSULLIVAN
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:15:45	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:15:59	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:21	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:16:25			OSULLIVAN
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:26	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:16:26	Sent to: Linked Events		OSULLIVAN
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:29	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:37	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:42	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:52	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:16:52	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		LEACH
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:16:55	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:17:04			WALKERC
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:17:04			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:17:04	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:17:04	Sent to: Linked Events		WALKERC
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:17:14	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST

	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:17:34	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:18:02	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:18:02	Paged SAF1		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:18:16			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:18:16	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:18:25	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:18:25			MABE
	SP	Spawned	04/10/2019 10:18:31	Spawned FIRE event #2019137287, callref #48		MABE
	CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 10:19:17	115 N DUKE ST --> Q	ACC	MABE
	CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 10:19:29	Q --> 115 N DUKE ST	ACC	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:19:30	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:19:35	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:19:39			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:19:39	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:20:10	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:20:34	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		OSULLIVAN
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:20:44	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:21:04	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		OSULLIVAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:22:48	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:23:28			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:23:28	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:23:52	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:23:58			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:23:58	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:25:35	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:25:49	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:26:17	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:26:20	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:26:38	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:26:46	Paged EM		PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:26:58			OSULLIVAN

	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:26:58	Sent to: Linked Events	OSULLIVAN
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:27:00	Paged EM	PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:27:12	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:27:29	Paged EM	PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:27:30		ZIMMERMAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:27:30	Sent to: Linked Events	ZIMMERMAN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:27:39	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:27:43	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:28:07	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:28:54	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:30:16	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	WHITIST
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:30:17		MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:30:17	Sent to: Linked Events	MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:30:20	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:31:11	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:32:16	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:35:50	Units: E9 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:35:57	Units: 7SQ >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:36:02	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:36:22	Units: B4 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:36:23	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CARDEN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:36:28	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:37:08	Units: L3 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:37:19	Units: E16 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:37:27	Units: FD20 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:37:28	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:37:41		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:37:41	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:37:52		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:37:52	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:37:59	Units: B1 >>> 20Min.	MABE

	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:39:02	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:39:20	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:39:40	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WATSON
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:39:57	Units: L2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:40:45	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CARDEN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:41:18		Unit:M7
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:42:50		MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:42:50	Sent to: Linked Events	MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:43:56	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	WHITIST
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:45:34	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CARDEN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:46:12	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:47:17		MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:47:17	Sent to: Linked Events	MITCHELLM
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:47:38	Units: E1 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:47:55	Units: E2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:48:01	Units: E2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:48:07	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CARDEN
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:48:48	Units: E3 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:48:53	Units: E4 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:48:54		Unit:M7
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:49:25	Units: E5 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:49:31	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CARDEN
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:49:35	Units: E9 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:49:47	Units: E10 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:50:00		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:50:00	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:51:29	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	RECO	Unit Rec Btn Click	04/10/2019 10:51:52	Unit recommend for STRUCTURE FIRE at 115 N DUKE ST (Caller:	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:52:00	Tone / Rip Run Button Clicked	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:52:01	Recmnd:E14 [ENG], E17 [ENG], L6 [LAD]	MABE
	RECO	Unit Recommendation	04/10/2019 10:52:01	Plan: RSK1 Cat: SF3 Lvl: 2	MABE

		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 10:52:02	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:52:09	Units: L12 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:52:17	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256			WHITIST
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:53:13	Units: 4SQ >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:53:20	Units: 7SQ >>> 20Min.			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:53:31	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262			WALKERC
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 10:56:23	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256			BRIDGESK
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:56:31	Units: E5 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:56:34	Units: L17 >>> 19Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:56:49	Units: B1 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:56:51	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:57:00	Units: E2 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:57:02	Units: E5 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:57:06	Units: E4 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:57:11	Units: E9 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:57:38	Units: L17 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:58:02	Units: L3 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:58:07	Units: MS1 >>> 15Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:58:28	Units: L3 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:58:43	Units: B2 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:59:03	Units: B2 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:59:06	Units: E2 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 10:59:11	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:00:08	Units: B4 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:00:19				MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:00:19	Sent to: Linked Events			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:01:40	Units: L12 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:01:54	Units: E5 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:05:04	Units: E3 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:05:27	Units: FD31 >>> 20Min.			MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:06:11	Units: E5 >>> 20Min.			MABE

	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:06:21	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WALKERC
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:06:53	Units: L2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:07:03	Units: L17 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:07:39	Units: L3 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:07:43	Units: L2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:08:15	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CARDEN
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:08:49	Units: FD31 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:09:18	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BLACKMANL
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:16:38	Units: 7SQ >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:17:41	Units: FD6 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:17:44	Units: E16 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:18:23	Units: E3 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:18:26	Units: L17 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:21:56	Units: E4 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:22:05		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:22:05	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:22:43		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:22:43	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:22:51	Units: L12 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:24:06	Units: B4 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:24:10	Units: FD20 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:24:12	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:24:37	Units: E2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:25:22	Units: L2 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:25:26	Units: E13 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:25:30	Units: HM13 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:25:36	Units: L17 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:26:22	Units: L3 >>> 20Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:26:43		MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:26:43	Sent to: Linked Events	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:26:47		MABE

		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:26:47	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:26:49	Units: Q7 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:26:52	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:26:52			MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:26:55	Units: 7SQ >>> 20Min.		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:27:14	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		MABE
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 11:27:36	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:27:38			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:27:38	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:30:26	Units: E4 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		CHG	Changed AddSt	04/10/2019 11:30:42	DIST: 126.31 FT -->	ACC	WALLO
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:34:59			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:34:59	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:35:15	Units: B2 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:35:17	Units: L17 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:41:11	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:43:05			WALLO
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:43:05	Sent to: Linked Events		WALLO
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:47:01	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WALLO
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:48:08			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:48:08	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:49:39	Units: B4 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:49:45	Units: B1 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:49:47	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:49:49	Units: FD20 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:50:21			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:50:21	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:50:30	Units: E13 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:50:47	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		WALKERC
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:51:25			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:51:25	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE

		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:51:27	Units: L17 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:51:29	Units: FD8 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:51:57	Units: Q11 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:53:19	Units: B2 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:53:59			MITCHELLM
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:53:59	Sent to: Linked Events		MITCHELLM
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 11:58:09	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:59:19	Units: B4 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:59:21	Units: FD20 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:59:24	Units: E16 >>> 20Min.		MABE
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 11:59:44	Units: FD31,FD36,FD6,FD20,MS1,HM13,DC100,EM3,Q7,B3,EM4,1SQ,E		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:01:08			BROWNS
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:01:08	Sent to: Linked Events		BROWNS
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:03:52			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:03:52	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:10:09			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:10:09	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:21:42	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 12:22:22	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262		OSULLIVAN
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 13:15:06	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 13:15:43	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137473		WHITIST
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 13:15:59	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137473		WHITIST
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 13:40:22	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 15:10:41	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 15:11:28	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 15:26:01			MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 15:26:01	Sent to: Linked Events		MABE
		ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 15:27:21	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256		WHITIST
		PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 15:46:36	Paged DFD		PAGESRV
		CHG	Changed Street	04/10/2019 15:56:33	115 N DUKE ST --> 115 N DUKE ST	ACC	OSULLIVAN
		RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 16:31:48	Units: E5 >>> 999Min.		MABE

	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 16:31:52	Units: TANK17 >>> 999Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 16:43:33	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	CARDEN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 16:44:36	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	CARDEN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 16:45:17	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 16:46:05	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	CARDEN
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:31:12	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:40:48		ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:40:48	Sent to: Linked Events	ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:45:25		ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:45:25	Sent to: Linked Events	ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:47:14	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:51:30	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BLACKMANL
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:53:54		MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:53:54	Sent to: Linked Events	MITCHELLM
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 17:55:03	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BLACKMANL
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 18:03:00	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 18:03:47	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 18:19:01	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 18:20:10	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 18:22:18	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 18:33:09	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BALLENTINE
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 19:15:08	Paged EM	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 19:15:10	Units: EM5 >>> 999Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 19:28:20	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	LEACH
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 19:31:56	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 19:58:45	Units: E18 >>> 999Min.	MABE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 21:06:06	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	ALLENJ
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 21:09:09	Units: L3 >>> 999Min.	PRICES
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/10/2019 21:22:19	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/10/2019 21:52:07	Units: FD36,TANK18,B3,E18,E19 >>> 999Min.	PRICES
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/10/2019 22:36:59	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	FRANCO

	VCHS	Viewed Call History	04/10/2019 23:00:23	Location Information	PRICES
	VCHS	Viewed Call Hist (Neighbo	04/10/2019 23:01:08	Location Information	PRICES
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 00:14:55	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BALLENTINE
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 00:19:44	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	HANDWORK
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/11/2019 00:26:24	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 00:43:23	Units: FD36,TANK18,TANK11 >>> 60Min.	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 00:58:45	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	PRICES
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 01:05:54	Units: FD36,TANK11,B4 >>> 60Min.	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 01:30:39	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	PRICES
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/11/2019 01:55:30	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 02:24:22	Units: E8 >>> 666Min.	PRICES
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 02:24:34	Units: FD36,TANK11,E8,B4 >>> 666Min.	PRICES
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/11/2019 03:23:53	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/11/2019 03:44:35	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 03:50:02	Units: FD36,E12,E8,TANK19 >>> 60Min.	WORRELLSW
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/11/2019 03:57:06	Paged DFD	PAGESRV
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 04:56:48	Units: FD36,E12,TANK19,E17 >>> 30Min.	WORRELLSW
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 05:27:11	Units: FD36,E12,TANK19,E17 >>> 30Min.	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 06:05:06	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	KENDALME
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 06:19:21	Units: FD36,E12,E17 >>> 666Min.	PRICES
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 07:13:55	Units: FD36,E12,SAF1 >>> 60Min.	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 08:15:01	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 08:15:16	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 08:15:24	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	WORRELLSW
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 08:19:57	Units: FD36,E1 >>> 60Min.	WORRELLSW
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 08:29:07	Units: FD36,E1 >>> 999Min.	WORRELLSW
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 08:29:13	Units: FD36,E1 >>> 999Min.	WORRELLSW
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 09:10:49	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BLACKMANL
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 09:12:23	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	BLACKMANL
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 09:35:43	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CAPPSA
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 09:35:56	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CAPPSA

	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 09:42:42	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	CAPPSA
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 09:46:30	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	KENDALME
	PAGE	Dispatch Page	04/11/2019 12:49:01	Paged EM	PAGESRV
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 13:08:03	Notes sent from EMS event #2019137262	MABE
	RSW	Reset Watchdog Timer	04/11/2019 13:10:03	Units: EM5 >>> 999Min.	CAPPSA
	VCHS	Viewed Call History	04/11/2019 16:52:25	Location Information	ZITTA
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 21:26:45	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	ALLENJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 21:33:48	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	HANDWORK
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 22:06:09	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	MILLERJ
	ARM	Added Remarks	04/11/2019 22:09:51	Notes sent from LAW event #2019137256	HANDWORK
	CHG	Changed PRIMEUNIT	04/11/2019 22:10:39	FD36 --> B1	PRICES



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Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574

April 10, 2019

Appendix 4

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Brian Graves  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2nd, 2019



*City of Durham*  
*Public Works Department*  
*Engineering Division*

101 City Hall Plaza, 3rd Floor, Durham, NC 27701  
Telephone: (919) 560-4326 Facsimile: (919) 560-4316

City of Durham  
Private Utility Excavation Permit

**APPLICATION INFORMATION:**

Permit Number: 18-2826

**Issued To:** Fiber Technologies Networks, L.L.C.

**Issue Date:** 06/27/2018

**Subcontractor:**

**Valid Until:** 06/25/2019

**Contact Name:** Michael Eades

**Subdivision:**

**Contact Address:** 300 Meridian Centre Blvd

**Application Project #** U20122-4-DT Durham

Rochester, NY 14618

**Phone #:** 585-445-5899

**Emergency Phone #:**

**Utility Type:**  Electrical conduit  Telecommunications cable  Gas line  
 Poles  Fiber Cable  
 Other

**Number and Size of conduits:**

**Type of Excavation**  Bore  Trench

<input type="checkbox"/> Pavement/Street Cut	L	0.00	ft	W	1.00	ft
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sidewalk Cut	L	100.00	ft	W	100.00	ft
<input type="checkbox"/> Driveway Cut	L	0.00	ft	W	0.00	ft
<input type="checkbox"/> Other						

**Dimensions of Proposed Excavations**

City R/W (in ft)	County (in ft)	Private Land (in ft)	Total Length (in ft)
11492.00	0.00	0.00	11492.00
Width (in ft)	Depth (in ft)		
0.00	0.00		

**Proposed Traffic Control**

Detour  
 Lane Restriction  
 Cones  
 Signs  
 Other

**Start Date:** 07/30/2018 **Duration:** 90

*All requests for street closings must be approved by the City Transportation Department.  
Contact: (919) 560-4366*

**Locations of Work:**

<b>Address Range</b>	<b>Street</b>	<b>Street Number</b>	<b>Cross Streets</b>
500 - 505	S Duke St		JACKSON ST and YANCEY ST
400 - 499	S Duke St		W CHAPEL HILL ST and JACKSON ST
307 - 399	S Duke St		MEMORIAL ST and W CHAPEL HILL ST
300 - 303	S Duke St		W PETTIGREW ST and MEMORIAL ST
200 - 299	S Duke St		W PEABODY ST and W PETTIGREW ST
100 - 199	S Duke St		W Main St and W PEABODY ST
100 - 199	N Duke St		W MAIN ST and W MORGAN ST
200 - 299	N Duke St		W MORGAN ST and FERNWAY AV
300 - 399	N Duke St		FERNWAY AV and W CORPORATION ST
500 - 699	W Main St		N GREAT JONES ST and FULLER ST
400 - 499	W Main St		E CHAPEL HILL ST and N GREAT JONES ST
300 - 399	W Main St		MARKET ST and W Chapel Hill St
200 - 299	W Main St		N CORCORAN ST and MARKET ST
100 - 199	W Main St		N MANGUM ST and N CORCORAN ST
100 - 199	E Main St		N MANGUM ST and N CHURCH ST

<b>Address Range</b>	<b>Street</b>	<b>Street Number</b>	<b>Cross Streets</b>
200 - 299	E Main St		N CHURCH ST and N ROXBORO ST
300 - 399	E Main St		N ROXBORO ST and N QUEEN ST
400 - 499	E Main St		N QUEEN ST and N DILLARD ST
500 - 533	E Main St		N DILLARD ST and COMMERCE ST
100 - 199	N Roxboro St		E MAIN ST and E PARRISH ST
100 - 199	N Mangum St		W Main St and W PARRISH ST
200 - 299	N Great Jones St		W Main St and W Morgan St
100 - 111	Market St		W MAIN ST and W PARRISH ST
112 - 199	Market St		W PARRISH ST and E CHAPEL HILL ST
200 - 299	E Chapel Hill St		MARKET ST and FOSTER ST
200 - 299	Foster St		E Chapel Hill St and W Morgan St
206 - 299	W Morgan St		HOLLAND ST and FOSTER ST
200 - 205	W Morgan St		Rigsbee Av and Holland St
300 - 399	Rigsbee Ave		W MORGAN ST and W SEMINARY AV
400 - 499	Rigsbee Ave		W SEMINARY AV and HUNT ST

<b>Address Range</b>	<b>Street</b>	<b>Street Number</b>	<b>Cross Streets</b>
500 - 599	Rigsbee Ave		Hunt St and Broadway St
600 - 699	Rigsbee Ave		Broadway St and W Corporation St
700 - 799	Rigsbee Ave		W CORPORATION ST and W GEER ST
700 - 799	W Main St		FULLER ST and N DUKE ST
100 - 103	S Corcoran St		W Ramseur St and W Main St

**Reason for Work:** Connect cell tower to aerial antennas on power poles.

**Applicant Signature:** MICHAEL EADES

**Application Received Date:** 06/26/2018

**Applicant Fee:** \$0.00

**Comments**

**Approved by:** Mike Ross

**Approval Date:** 06/27/2018

**Inspection Request Date:**

**Inspection Date:**

**Inspector:**

**Comments**

**Submitter Comments**

**Reviewer Comments**

There may be City of Durham water, sanitary sewer, storm drainage, and service laterals in the vicinity of the proposed work. Avoid encumbering any City of Durham utilities. Contact NC 811 for utility locates as required by law.

Aboveground obstacles (poles, pedestals, etc.) are not allowed in public utility easements. The City of Durham has and will continue to install sidewalk at various locations throughout the City. Special consideration should be exercised in selecting placement of all above ground obstacles.

The Prime applicant is responsible for relocating any facilities placed in conflict with City utilities &/or in conflict with future City infrastructure development. All contractors are required to have an electronic or hard copy of the permit on site throughout the duration of work in City ROW.

**Notes**

Inspections are required prior to placing any concrete in the City R/W and for all asphalt work. Inspections should be requested through the web-based program. For work in the City R/W a Final Inspection should be requested when all work and final restoration of the permitted area is complete using the web-based program. 1. Underground conduit shall be placed at a minimum depth of 24 inches for trench and plow applications, cable or conduit installed by directional bore shall maintain a minimum depth of 24 inches. Vertical separation from city utilities shall be a minimum of 18 inches. Horizontal clearance of 36 inches minimum shall be maintained from the outer edge of city utilities including water, sanitary sewer, and storm drainage. 2. Directional bore method of installation parallel to state roadway shall be at a minimum depth of 60 inches. 3. All directional bores under state roadways to be a minimum of 10 feet deep. All directional bores under controlled access to be a minimum of 15 feet deep.

4. 12, 20, & 24 inch diameter distribution & transmission mains are located in close proximity to this permitted work.





# GENERAL NOTES

## GENERAL NOTES

### HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

THE CONTRACTOR SHALL NOTIFY THE JURISDICTIONAL PERMIT AGENCY IMMEDIATELY IF ANY MATERIALS ARE ENCOUNTERED THAT ARE CONSIDERED HAZARDOUS BY THE EPA, DCO, OR OSHA, OR IF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ARE ENCOUNTERED BY PERSONNEL. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL SECURE THE SITE AND PREVENT THE ACCIDENTAL EXPOSURE BY THE PUBLIC OR THE CONTRACTOR'S AERIAL. THE CONTRACTOR MAY EVACUATE UP TO, BUT SHALL NOT DISTURB KNOWN HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SUCH AS ASBESTOS, OILS, ACID, ETC. THE REMOVAL OF ALL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MUST BE DONE BY AN APPROVED OR CERTIFIED HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CONTRACTOR LICENSED IN THE APPROPRIATE STATE.

### GENERAL NOTES

A COPY OF ALL COPIES/COPIES, PERTINENT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AND THE PROJECT OFFICE AND THE JOB SITE.

### AERIAL NOTES

\*AERIAL CONSTRUCTION TO BE PERFORMED TO INDUSTRY ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS.

### OWNER NOTES

\*ALL HEIGHTS OF CABLE PLACEMENT WILL BE RECORDED AT TIME OF CONSTRUCTION. DOCUMENT ALL POINTS OF ATTACHMENT.

### OWNER NOTES

\*ALL EXTENSION ARMS TO BE PLACED WILL BE BEFORE RAILS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED OR APPROVED BY THE INSPECTOR.

### OWNER NOTES

\*BOND STRAND TO POWER MGN WHERE APPLICABLE. ANCHORS TO BE USED WILL BE 3/8" SCREW IN TYPE.

### OWNER NOTES

\*ALL STRAPS WILL BE PLACED "A" BEFORE AND AFTER EVERY SUPPORTING CLAMP AT A MINIMUM OF 21" APART.

### OWNER NOTES

\*P.O.A. = POINT OF ATTACHMENT.

### OWNER NOTES

\*ADD MISSING GROUNDS.

### OWNER NOTES

\*REPAIR/REPLACE EXISTING LASHING WIRE IF DAMAGED.

### OWNER NOTES

\*REPAIR/REPLACE EXISTING LASHING WIRE IF DAMAGED.

### OWNER NOTES

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### OWNER NOTES

\*REPAIR/REPLACE EXISTING LASHING WIRE IF DAMAGED.

### GENERAL NOTES


### SPECIAL UTILITY CLEARANCES

### GENERAL NOTES

## TYPIICALS

**FEATURES**  
THIS ASSEMBLY IS RATED FOR  
STATIC DESIGN LOAD OF 15,000  
N/720 N OVER A 10 [254] X 25  
MM AREA AND MUST PASS A MIN.  
STATIC TEST LOAD OF 45,136  
N/20,765 N.


**COVER FEATURES:**  
• STANDARD LOAD RATING: 45,136 POUND WHEEL LOAD  
• POLYMER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION  
• 100% RECYCLED MATERIALS




"36" x "48" x "30" HANDHOLE HUBBELL MODEL PG3048BA36 OR EQUAL

PLACEMENT - TYPICALS

### Typical "B"




### TYPICAL "A"




**NOTE:**  
BACKFILL MUST BE MADE  
WITH ROCK FREE MATERIAL

DUKE UTILITY POLE, TYP.  
#LR94BL AND #BK51BL




POLE DETAIL

5  
NTS



TYPICAL DETAIL - # 14




DESCRIPTION: DRAWING NAME: U201224 - SMC DT DURHAM 01-15-19 dwg  
CONFIDENTIAL/PROPRIETARY SHEET 0 OF 14

# TYPICALS


PARALLEL CONDUIT DETAIL FOR NCBOI RIGHT-OF-WAY

NOT TO SCALE





DIRECTIONAL BORE UNDER SECONDARY ROADWAY

NOT TO SCALE



DIRECTIONAL BORE UNDER GREEK BED

NOT TO SCALE



BORE DETAIL WITH  
(2) 1-1/4" INNER DIA'S, SPL-11  
K-55

(2) 1.25" INNER DIA'S, SPL-11

K-55

PROJECT MANAGER: Matt O'Brien			
PROJECT ENGINEER: Matthew Hall	AS-BUILT	REVISION #: 1	
PROJECT NUMBER: U201224-DT DURHAM	1	1-16-19	
DESCRIPTION: NC 57 Small Cell Design	2	ENG DESIGN	ORIGINAL
DRAWING NAME: U201224-SMC DT DURHAM 01-1-19.dwg	3	DATE	DRAFTING
			COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL/Proprietary


Sheet E-Of 14



# TYPICALS

## DIRECTIONAL BORE TIE-IN DETAIL

NOT TO SCALE




## TIE-IN STATION

- BORE FROM EACH DIRECTION IS RUN AT DESIGN DEPTH TO 2 FEET PAST THE INTENDED TIE-IN, THEN TURNED UP TO DAYLIGHT.
- THE TIE-IN POINT IS EXCAVATED. THE CONDUITS CUT OFF WHERE THEY CROSS EACH OTHER AT DESIGN DEPTH, AND A COUPLER IS INSTALLED TO CONNECT THE TWO CONDUITS AT THE DESIGN DEPTH.
- ALL EXCAVATIONS OR TRENCHES 4 FEET OR GREATER IN DEPTH SHALL BE APPROPRIATELY BENCH, SHORED, OR SLOPED IN OSHA'S EXCAVATION STANDARD. 29 CFR 1926.650, .651, AND .652

## HANDHOLE CONSTRUCTION DETAILS, CONDUIT TO HANHOLE PROFILE FOR RW CONSTRUCTION


NOT TO SCALE



- ALL EXCAVATIONS OR TRENCHES 4 FEET OR GREATER IN DEPTH SHALL BE APPROPRIATELY BENCH, SHORED, OR SLOPED ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN OSHA'S EXCAVATION STANDARD, 29 CFR 1926.650, .651, AND .652.

## CULVERT CROSSING DETAIL

NOT TO SCALE



PROJECT MANAGER: Matt Odeberg

PROJECT ENGINEER: Matthew Hall

REVISION #: 1

ORIGINAL

COMMENT

DRAFTING

DATE

1-16-19

1

DESCRIPTION: NC 57 Small Cell Design

DRAWING NAME: UDR3224-SMC DT DURHAM 01-16-19.dwg

CONFIDENTIAL/PROPRIETARY

SHEET: F OF 14

# MATERIALS RAKE-OFF

Total Underground Rake Off					
Unit Code & Description		Units	Estimated Quantity	Actual Quantity	
144-COUNT FIBER OPTIC CABLE (5% ADDER INCLUDED)		FT	14,624		
24-COUNT FIBER OPTIC CABLE (5% ADDER INCLUDED)		FT	2,349		
(2) 1.25" HDPE SDR 11 CONDUIT (5% ADDER INCLUDED)		FT	12,075		
(3) 1.25" HDPE SDR 11 CONDUIT (5% ADDER INCLUDED)		FT	71		
(1) 4" HDPE SDR 11 CONDUIT (5% ADDER INCLUDED)		FT	615		
HANDHOLES - 30" X 48" X 36"		EACH	15		
HANDHOLES - 24" X 36" X 24"		EACH	12		
FIBER MARKER POST		EACH	28		
CUT AND RESTORE CONCRETE SIDEWALK		SQ. FT	425		
CUT AND RESTORE BRICK PAVERS		SQ. FT	225		

3		AS-BUILT
2		REVISION <b>1</b>
1	1-16-19	
NO.	DATE	
	ENG DESIGN	DRAFTING
	COMMENT	

**utilis**

PROJECT MANAGER: Matt O'Leary  
 PROJECT ENGINEER: Matthew Hall  
 PROJECT NUMBER: U201224-DT DURHAM  
 DESCRIPTION: NC 51 Small Cell Design  
 DRAWING NAME: U201224-SNC-DT DURHAM 0115.dwg  
 CONFIDENTIAL/Proprietary

SHEET: G OF 14

## SECTION 2

MATCH TO SHEET 2

Sheets 1-7

FIBER SECTION 5 - (Sheets 1-14)  
 (1) 144 FIBER OPTIC CABLE (DEIECTRIC)  
 LATERAL B.  
 MEASURED LENGTH = 4,359'  
 CUT LENGTH = 4,577'  
 LINEAR FOOTAGE = 3,560'

PLACE:  
 (1) 30'x48"x36" HANHOLE  
 • LEAVE 100' SLACK LOOP 144  
 • LEAVE 100' SLACK LOOP 144 LATERAL B FIBER  
 • CUT AND RESTORE 25 SQ. FT CONCRETE  
 SIDEWALK

PLACE:  
 (2) 1.25' HOPE SDR 11 CONDUIT  
 (1) 144 DECTRIC FIBER  
 (1) TRACER WIRE  
 (1) MULE TAPE  
 MINIMUM DEPTH = 36"


PLACE:  
 (1) 30'x48"x36" HANHOLE  
 • LEAVE 100' SLACK LOOP 144  
 • LEAVE 100' SLACK LOOP 144  
 • LATERS A 144  
 • CUT AND RESTORE 25 SQ.  
 FT BRICK PAVERS

144 FIBER TO BE  
 PLACED BY UTILIS INTO  
 MACRO

VERIZON HANHOLE TO  
 BE PLACED BY VERIZON.  
 SEE VZN SOW

### CROSSING PROFILE

MARKET ST FACING NORTH



BORE TO MANTAIN  
 MINIMUM DEPTH OF 4'  
 BELOW CITY  
 MAINTAINED ROADWAY

400' FROM HANHOLE TO  
 HANHOLE

MATCH TO SHEET 1A

811

Know what's below  
 Call before you dig

SCALE: 1"=50'

#

SEE DRAWINGS TO PHOTO LOCATIONS AND DIRECTION. SEE  
 SHEET 1 FOR SITE PHOTOGRAPHS.

COMMENT

PROJECT MANAGER: Matt O'Brien  
 PROJECT ENGINEER: Matt Avery Hall  
 PROJECT NUMBER: 20220724-DT-DURHAM  
 DESCRIPTION: NC 51 Smart Cell Design  
 DRAWING NAME: 20220724-DT-DURHAM 075-2009

CONFIDENTIAL/PROPRIETARY

SHEET 1 OF 14

PROPOSED FIBERTECH AERIAL

PROPOSED FIBERTECH UNDERGROUND

RIGHT OF WAY

FENCE

GUARDRAIL

DITCH LINE

SIDEWALK

CULVERT

EXISTING UTILITY POLE

PROPOSED FIBERTECH HANDLE

PROPOSED FIBERTECH PEDESTAL

EXISTING HANDLE

EXISTING PEDESTAL

EXISTING HYDRANT

LIGHT POLE

EXISTING MANHOLE

SEWER MANHOLE

WATER VAULT

GAS VALVE



CATCH BASIN

TREE

TRANSFORMER

CROSSING PROFILE

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
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
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
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
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




















SECTION 2  
SHEETS 1-7

SHEETS 1

**LEGEND**

Symbol	Description
—	PROPOSED FIBERTECH AERIAL
- - -	PROPOSED FIBERTECH UNDERGROUND
—	RIGHT OF WAY
—	FENCE
—	GUARDRAIL
—	DITCH LINE
—	SIDEWALK
—	CULVERT
⊗	EXISTING UTILITY POLE
H	PROPOSED FIBERTECH HANDBOLE
HH	PROPOSED FIBERTECH PEDESTAL
—	EXISTING HANDBOLE
—	EXISTING PEDESTAL
♂	EXISTING HYDRANT
XX	LIGHT POLE
MH	EXISTING MANHOLE
○	SEWER MANHOLE
W	WATER VAULT
I	WATER VALVE
○	GS VALVE
□	CATCH BASIN
—	TREE
—	TRANSFORMER

**SYMBOL CORRESPONDENCE TO PHOTO LOCATIONS AND ORIENTATION SEE SHEET 1 FOR SITE PHOTOGRAPHS.**

**801**  
Know what's below.  
Call before you dig.


**SCALE: 1=50'**


**AS-BUILT**  
REVISION # 1  
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
**PROJECT MANAGER: [Redacted] and Others**  
PROJECT ENGINEER: [Redacted] and Others  
DRAWING NUMBER: U010722-01 DT DURHAM  
DESCRIPTION: NC 27 Small Cell Design  
DRAWING DATE: 10/05/2014  
DRAFTING DATE: 10/05/2014  
CONFIDENTIAL/PROPRIETARY  
SHEET 7 OF 14


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
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


SECTION 1  
SHEETS 8-11B











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Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574

April 10, 2019


Appendix 5

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Brian Graves  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2nd, 2019

**KEYED NOTES – DEMOLITION**

1000



KEYED NOTES - NEW WORK

1. **W**hat is the most common cause of death in the United States?

2. **W**hat is the most common cause of death in the United States?

3. **W**hat is the most common cause of death in the United States?

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
18. **W**hat is the most common cause of death in the United States?

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
02 PLUMBING - FLOOR PLAN - NEW WORK

SCALE: 1/4"



01 PLUMBING - FLOOR PLAN - DEMOLITION

SCALE: 1/4" = 1'-0"



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PROJECT:  
**KAFFEINATE COFFEE SHOP ALTERATIONS**  
115A NORTH DUKE STREET: DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA  
OWNER:  
**KONG LEE**



CHAD F. CHANDLER  
ARCHITECT, PA



---

Fatal Natural Gas Explosion  
Origin and Cause Investigation Report  
Incident No. 19-1909574

April 10, 2019

Appendix 6

---

Brian Graves  
Assistant Fire Marshal  
City of Durham Fire Department  
August 2nd, 2019



I2019-04550

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER  
Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-3025

## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY MEDICAL EXAMINER

OCME USE ONLY	
19-3846	
Case Number	
APR 24 2019	
Date Received	
<input type="checkbox"/> Res <input type="checkbox"/> NR	

DECEDENT: **KONG LEE**  
 First      Middle      Last      Suffix  
 RESIDENCE: **2976 TILLINGHAST TRL RALEIGH, NC WAKE**  
 Number and Street      City, State      County  
 AGE: **61**      SEX:  Male  Female  Unknown  
 RACE:  Asian  Black  Native American  White  Other  
 HISPANIC ORIGIN:  Yes  No  Unknown

INFORMATION ABOUT OCCURRENCE				
	DATE	TIME	ADDRESS OR FACILITY	COUNTY
ONSET OF INJURY OR ILLNESS	04/10/2019	10:07	115A N DUKE ST, DURHAM NC	DURHAM
DEATH	04/10/2019	12:33	115A N DUKE ST, DURHAM NC	Durham
VIEW OF BODY	04/12/2019	09:47	<input type="checkbox"/> Scene of Death <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital <input type="checkbox"/> Funeral Home  <input type="checkbox"/> Morgue <b>OCME - RALEIGH</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Not Viewed <i>Facility Name</i>	
ME NOTIFIED	04/10/2019	13:05	LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: <b>DURHAM PD</b>	
LAST KNOWN TO BE ALIVE	04/10/2019	10:00	OFFICER: <b>R. ARMSTRONG</b> TELEPHONE: <b>(919) 698-7122</b>	

AUTOPSY:  None  M.E. Authorized  Non-M.E./Private-Facility Name: \_\_\_\_\_BLOOD SAMPLE: Mailed by:  ME after External  Pathologist after Autopsy  Reason not obtained: \_\_\_\_\_

IF CLINICAL ALCOHOL PERFORMED, RESULT: \_\_\_\_\_ Where: \_\_\_\_\_

PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH:  Pending

1. **MULTIPLE BLUNT FORCE INJURIES**  
DUE TO
2. \_\_\_\_\_  
DUE TO
3. \_\_\_\_\_  
DUE TO
4. \_\_\_\_\_

CONTRIBUTING CONDITIONS

MANNER OF DEATH:

Natural  Accident  Homicide  Suicide  Pending

<i>This Section "OCME REVIEW ONLY"</i>		SDC <i>None</i>
1. _____ DUE TO	2. _____ DUE TO	AL Dictated
3. _____ DUE TO	4. _____	COG
CONTRIBUTING CONDITIONS		
MANNER OF DEATH:		
Natural      Accident      Homicide      Suicide      Undetermined Reviewer: <i>[Signature]</i> Date: <b>5/17/14</b> <i>Information in this block supersedes that contained in space at left.</i>		

I hereby certify that after receiving notice of the death described herein I took charge of the body and made inquiries regarding the cause of death in accordance with Article 16 of Chapter 130A of the N.C. General Statutes and the information contained herein regarding such death is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

*[Signature]* **04/22/2019** **DURHAM**  
 Signature of Medical Examiner      Date      County of Appointment  
**MARK ONFFREY**  
 Print Name of Medical Examiner

## MEDICAL HISTORY

Alcoholism     Cancer     Depression     Diabetes     Hypertension  
 Ischemic Heart Disease     Seizure Disorder     Smoking     Substance Abuse  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_ Physician \_\_\_\_\_ City \_\_\_\_\_

## MEANS OF DEATH

VEHICLE: Type of vehicle associated with this decedent:  
 ATV     Bicycle     Farm Equipment     Moped     Motorcycle     Passenger Car  
 Pickup Truck     Truck -more than 2 axle     SUV     Other \_\_\_\_\_  
**Position:**  Driver     Passenger     Pedestrian     Unknown  
**Devices:**  Seat Restraints     Air Bag     Helmet     Child Restraint     None     Unknown  
*Number of Units Involved:* \_\_\_\_\_  
 GUN:     Rifle-Caliber \_\_\_\_\_     Handgun-Caliber \_\_\_\_\_     Shotgun-Gauge \_\_\_\_\_     Unknown  
 INSTRUMENT:     Asphyxial     Blunt     Sharp    Description \_\_\_\_\_  
 TOXIC AGENT(S) SUSPECTED:  Alcohol     Others \_\_\_\_\_     Noted in Summary on Page 4  
 DROWNING:     Bathtub     Lake     Ocean     Pond     Pool     River     Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Life Preserver:  Yes     No     Unknown    Able to swim:  Yes     No     Unknown  
 Activity \_\_\_\_\_  
 FIRE:    Suspected Cause: GAS EXLOSION, BUILDING COLLAPSE    Smoke Detector:  Yes     No     Unknown  
 FALL:    From:  Sitting     Standing     Other \_\_\_\_\_    Approximate Distance \_\_\_\_\_ (Feet)

## ACTIVITY OF DECEDENT AND PREMISES

## Work Related:

Fatal Injury or Illness Occurred on a Job\*:  Yes     No     Unknown

If Yes, was employment:  Primary Job     Secondary     Volunteer Work     Unknown

Name of this employing firm or agency \_\_\_\_\_ SELF-EMPLOYED

Type of business or industry \_\_\_\_\_ CAFE/RESTAURANT    Decedent's occupation \_\_\_\_\_ OWNER

\*Activity on a job that is income generating regardless of age of decedent including farming or part time work; also include non-income generating volunteer or charity work.

## Non-Work Related: (See Examples Below)

**FATAL INJURY OR ILLNESS:** Activity \_\_\_\_\_  Unknown

Type of place \_\_\_\_\_ Specific location \_\_\_\_\_

Examples-Activity: Running, lifting hay bales, eating, typing letter, driving commercial truck, sleeping, bathing, watching television, fight, etc.

Type of place: House, apartment, trailer, school, jail, bar or tavern, hotel, restaurant, store, street, hospital, farm, highway, factory, etc.

Specific location: Bathroom, assembly line, kitchen, front yard, office, parking lot, emergency room, roadside, ambulance, etc.

**DEATH:** Type of place \_\_\_\_\_ CAFE/RESTAURANT    Specific location \_\_\_\_\_ INDOORS

Death occurred while in custody:  Yes     No     Unknown

If yes, was in:  County Jail     State Prison     Federal Prison     Police Presence

Death occurred in State Operated Facility:  Yes     No

## DESCRIPTION OF BODY

For Pathologists Only:

Refer to Autopsy Report

CONDITION:  Intact     Decomposed     Fragmented     Skeletonized  
 Embalmed     Charred     Prolonged immersion

RIGOR:  None     1+     2+     3+

LIVOR:  None     Anterior     Posterior     Lateral    Color: FIXED - PURPLE

LENGTH: 66 INCHES     Estimate    WEIGHT: 159 POUNDS     Estimate

BODY TEMPERATURE:  Warm     Cool     Cold    HAIR: Color: BLACK     Facial \_\_\_\_\_

EYES: Color: BROWN    Abnormalities \_\_\_\_\_

TEETH: LOWER:  Natural     Dentures     None    UPPER:  Natural     Dentures     None

PHOTOGRAPHS:  Yes     No    RADIOGRAPHS:  Yes     No

CLOTHING: ONE (1) RED SHIRT (BURNED), ONE (1) WHITE T-SHIRT (BURNED), ONE (1) PAIR TAN PANTS (DAMAGED)  Not Clothed

ONE (1) PAIR BLACK UNDERWEAR, TWO (2) BLACK SOCKS, TWO (2) BLACK TENNIS SHOES, ONE (1) BLACK BELT

VALUABLES: ONE (1) BLACK MOBILE PHONE, ONE (1) BLACK WALLET, SEVEN (7) \$20 BILLS,  No Valuables




FIVE (5) \$5 BILLS, THREE (3) \$1 BILLS, ONE (1) QUARTER, ONE (1) NICKEL, FOUR (4) PENNIES

KONG

LEE

## BODY DIAGRAMS

Legend:	
A= Abrasion	G= Gunshot
B= Burn	L= Laceration
C= Contusion	S= Stab



Indicate nature, location and measurements of wounds and other lesions (scars, tattoos, medical therapy, etc.) on these diagrams  
(Not to Scale)

**MEDICAL EXAMINER PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING DEATH\***

On April 10th, 2019 an explosion and building collapse occurred at 115A North Duke Street in Durham, NC. A single decedent was reported to OCME at 13:05.

Sandra Jones (ME Specialist) visited the scene and spoke with Law Enforcement on April 10th, 2019. Her report includes:

"A gas leak had been reported and the area was evacuated. The owner of Kaffeinate had refused to evacuate and law enforcement had been dispatched to remove him from the premises. Durham Fire Department and PSNC Energy, a natural gas company, arrived at the business and were present when the explosion occurred. Injuries were sustained by individuals on scene..."

...115 North Duke Street was reduced to rubble and the debris spilled into the street. There was obvious deformity to the exterior brick walls of the two-story building across the street. Part of the Northwest wall of 115 North Duke Street still stood. The first story of the Northwest wall had collapsed, and debris spilled into the parking lot. The Northeast wall of the building beside it (111 North Duke Street) had collapsed. Smoke was visibly rising from the rubble and fire personnel were actively fighting to suppress the fire..

...The decedent was located in the rubble closest to North Duke Street. The body was visible from the street and first responders had placed a sheet over him. According to law enforcement, when EMS arrived on scene the decedent had a pulse but they were unable to extricate him from the debris due to the surrounding hazards."

At 17:28, decedent was reportedly presumed to be Kong Lee, owner of the coffee shop where the explosion was believed to have originated. Condition was reported as intact and visually identifiably "burned but not charred".

Decedent identified on April 11th, 2019 as Kong Lee. Visual identification was made by law enforcement using both a photo provided by family, and a tattoo on the left shoulder.

External examination performed by M. Oniffrey on April 12th, 2019 at 09:47.

**PURPOSE:** To document the findings of a Medical Examiner investigation. \*This is not an autopsy report. When completed, this form constitutes a report to the Chief Medical Examiner as required by G.S. 130A-385(a); within fourteen (14) days of Medical Examiner's examination.

**PREPARATION:** The investigating Medical Examiner completes all appropriate information, and signs the certification statement on the front of the form.

**DISTRIBUTION:** Mail original copy to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, 3025 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, NC 27699-3025

**DISPOSITION:** This form is maintained by the Chief Medical Examiner in accordance with the current records disposition schedule published by the N.C. Division of Archives and History.

**COPIES:** Additional copies may be ordered from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Raleigh, NC 27699-3025

Electronic Investigation Report can be emailed to [ocme.eIR@dhhs.nc.gov](mailto:ocme.eIR@dhhs.nc.gov) . You do not need to send via postal mail